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Externalities associated with automobile use have long been an important 
topic in environmental and urban economics. Air pollution and traffic congestion 
constitute two main external costs of driving (Parry, Walls and Harrington 2007). 
Because pricing approaches such as higher fuel taxes and road pricing are unpopular, 
various travel demand management (TDM) programs aiming to control vehicle travel 
demand through non-pricing approaches have been adopted by government agencies
across the country. These programs provide public information, use persuasion, 
subsidize transit riding, and promote carpooling and telecommuting. However,
whether these programs generate incentives for people to reduce driving remains an 
open question.
I address this question with respect to two types of TDM strategies: 
telecommuting and public information provision. The first essay examines whether 
telecommuting opportunities lead employees to have longer commute lengths. 
Because telecommuting is often jointly chosen with commuting patterns and no 
single dataset contains sufficient information to solve the endogeneity problem, I use 
a two-sample instrumental variables technique to estimate the causal impact of 
telecommuting on commute length. The data for the project are assembled from the 
May 2001 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 2000 Census 5% Public Use 
Micro-data Series (PUMS). The results suggest that telecommuting increases married 
female workers’ one-way commute time by 9 – 12 minutes, but the effect on male 
workers’ commute length is not precisely estimated. Although telecommuting may 
still cut down total commute miles, it is less effective than expected, in particular for 
married women.
The second essay assesses the effectiveness of the Air Quality Action Days 
program in the Baltimore metropolitan area in getting cars off the road on high ozone 
days. The program asks people to reduce vehicle trips on code red days when the 
ozone level is forecast to exceed the EPA’s standard. I look at traffic volumes on 
highways in the Baltimore area, and using a regression discontinuity design, measure 
the extent that traffic is lower due to the announcement. I find that the program 
generally has little effect except that it reduces morning inbound traffic by 4-5 
percent. Evening outbound traffic declines correspondingly.
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Automobile use generates significant negative externalities that can be quite 
costly to the society. Some economists estimate that external costs amount to 5 cents per 
mile in the form of congestion, 2 cents per mile in air pollution and 3 cents per mile in 
accidents (Parry, Walls and Harrington 2007). The externalities associated with driving 
are not an easy problem to solve. For instance, road capacity expansion has not proved 
effective in mitigating congestion due to latent demand (e.g. Small 1992a), and it 
exacerbates the air pollution problem by encouraging more driving. Economic theory 
suggests that excess driving can be reduced by adding the extra social cost caused by 
vehicle driving to a driver's personal cost calculation. This can be accomplished with 
instruments like higher fuel taxes and/or a congestion toll. However, in the US where car 
ownership is prevalent and demand for vehicle travel is price inelastic, it is not surprising 
that these pricing approaches have little political support. Meanwhile, government 
agencies such as urban planning boards have been interested in controlling the demand 
for vehicle travel directly. They have developed various travel demand management 
(TDM) programs that provide public information, use persuasion, subsidize transit riding, 
and promote carpooling and telecommuting. However, whether these programs generate 
incentives for people to reduce driving remains an open question.
1.1 Objective of the dissertation
This dissertation evaluates two distinct TDM strategies: telecommuting and a 
public information program. The focus of Chapter 2 is the impact of telecommuting on 
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total commute miles. Telecommuting refers to working from home instead of traveling to 
work at least two days every month. In addition to being a favorable arrangement 
between employers and employees, telecommuting is increasingly used as a TDM 
strategy in order to mitigate urban congestion and air pollution attributable to commute 
trips. However, to what extent telecommuting reduces vehicle miles traveled (VMTs) 
depends on how it affects commute VMTs and non-commute VMTs. The impact of 
telecommuting on commute VMTs depends on the effect of telecommuting on one-way 
commuting length as well as telecommuting frequency. The naïve conclusion that 
telecommuting reduces total commute miles in the same proportion as it reduces 
commuting frequency could be wrong because telecommuting may actually increase one-
way commuting length. 
The goal of Chapter 2 is to empirically measure the impacts of telecommuting on 
one-way commute length and the probability of driving to work. One of the difficulties is
that telecommuting is not a random choice. Individuals who telecommute could be 
systematically different from non-telecommuters in unobserved ways that are also 
correlated with commuting behavior. I employ instrumental variable methods to obtain 
consistent estimates, and develop an instrumental variable that captures variation in
telecommuting opportunity across occupation and city size. Another difficulty is that 
there exists no single data set that contains telecommuting, commuting and the 
instrumental variable. The problem is tackled by using the two-sample instrumental 
variable technique, initially developed in Angrist and Krueger (1992). The two samples 
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come from the May 2001 CPS and 2000 PUMS, both of which are nationally 
representative.
Chapter 3 looks at a specific public information program---the Air Quality Action 
Days program in the Baltimore metropolitan area---which features a code red day alert 
when ground-level ozone is forecast to exceed the EPA’s standard. The program not only 
warns the public of high ozone levels but also tries to lower ozone concentrations on 
those days by persuading people not to drive. The program can be viewed as a TDM 
initiative that aims to influence vehicle travel episodically for environmental purposes. It 
is unclear, however, whether an individual would forego driving on code red days even if 
he/she internalizes the environmental cost resulting from his/her driving. Driving might 
still be the optimal mode choice because a person has a smaller risk of being exposed to 
bad air when driving than when walking to transit. This chapter conducts an evaluation of 
effectiveness of the program in reducing on-road vehicles. A regression discontinuity 
design is employed to overcome potential omitted variable bias, since the code red day is 
a discontinuous function of an observed continuous variable, forecast ozone level. 
In sum, the dissertation studies two popular TDM strategies from an economic 
perspective. Potential behavioral responses are taken into account and state-of-the-art 
econometric techniques are used in the analysis to carefully examine the effectiveness of 
the strategies in lowering vehicle travel. Both positive and negative findings should be 
useful to economists. The former may lead us to re-think TDM programs and consider 
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combining pricing approaches with TDM. A negative finding could strengthen the
argument for a complete pricing strategy.
1.2 Contribution to the Literature
Most empirical studies about telecommuting are designed to identify what factors 
explain the choice of telecommuting. Relatively few studies examine the impacts of 
telecommuting on commute length or total VMTs. The results from previous studies are 
mixed, with earlier ones suggesting a reduction in total VMTs and later ones showing 
positive effects on one-way commute distance and total commute miles. But most studies 
are subject to two critical shortcomings. First, telecommuting is assumed to be exogenous 
in explaining commute distance or miles. Second, the datasets used in the analyses are 
usually small and not representative. 
The main contribution of Chapter 2 is that I tackle the endogeneity issue with an 
instrumental variable procedure and use large, nationally representative samples
assembled from the 2001 CPS and 2000 PUMS. The instrumental variable measures the 
internet penetration for working from home across different occupation by city size cells, 
which should capture in exogenous telecommuting opportunity for individuals.  Because 
of the data constraints mentioned in the previous section, I apply the two-sample 
instrumental variable technique of Angrist and Krueger (1992) to information on 
telecommuting from the May 2001 CPS and information on commuting from the 2000 
PUMS. As both datasets are national samples, the results have implications for different 
regions and working groups. 
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The main findings are that telecommuting leads married female workers’ one-way 
commute time to increase by 9 – 12 minutes and has a smaller, positive, but statistically 
insignificant effect on men’s commute time. Exploring heterogeneous impacts between 
married women, single women and men is an innovation to the literature. It is plausible to 
expect that married women are more responsive to lower commuting costs as they are 
more often the secondary earner in a two-earner household and are likely to be more 
constrained in workplace locations. The results confirm these expectations.
Another contribution is to apply the same method to the probability of driving to 
work. The OLS estimates using the 2001 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) 
data show that the propensity of driving to work declines among telecommuters. This 
result implies that telecommuting provides an extra bonus by changing commute modes
in favor of transit. However, the two-sample instrumental variables estimates indicate
that telecommuting has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on commute mode 
choice. They suggest that the OLS estimates could be misleading without correcting the 
endogeneity problem. Overall, the chapter suggests that telecommuting is less effective in 
lowering total commute miles than people think it is, in particular for married women.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by examining a public information program 
in Baltimore, and exploiting the program’s institutional features to identify the traffic 
reduction attributable to the program. Similar advisory programs have been implemented 
in other urban areas that have ozone problem. Earlier studies either rely on survey 
respondents’ stated information or are unable to detect a change in traffic caused by the 
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program. Only the recent study by Cutter and Neidell (2007) uses the same econometric 
technique and reaches similar conclusions as my study does, but instead looks at the San 
Francisco Bay area. I find that the code red day announcements result in morning traffic 
reductions by 3 – 5%. This reduction occurs only for inbound traffic in the morning and 
outbound traffic in the evening.
1.3 Plan of the Dissertation
Chapters 2 and 3 are both self-contained essays. Chapter 2 examines the impact of 
telecommuting on one-way commuting length and on the probability of driving to work.
Chapter 3 estimates the effect of code red day announcements on traffic volumes in the 
Baltimore Metropolitan area. Each chapter starts with an introduction of the research 
question, methodology and main findings. More detailed research or institutional 
background is provided next, and followed by a simple theoretical model to convey the 
key intuitions. Empirical methods as well as the data used are described. The main results 
and sensitivity checks are presented in subsequent sections. Each essay ends with a
further discussion of the findings and conclusions. Chapter 4 summarizes the main 
findings in both essays and draws some common conclusions. It also discusses the 
questions stemming from the study that deserve future research.
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2 The Impact of Telecommuting on the Journey to Work: A Two-
Sample Instrumental Variables Approach
2.1 Introduction
Telecommuting reduces both the monetary and psychological costs of commuting.  
Employers, by allowing workers to telecommute, can recruit and retain valued employees 
and possibly reduce the costs of office space and administrative support. More 
importantly, telecommuting is increasingly suggested as a solution to traffic congestion 
and air pollution in urban areas.   For instance, the Connecticut Department of 
Transportation established a statewide initiative "Telecommute Connecticut!" to help 
employers within the state set up and run telecommuting programs.1 In May 2006, the 
U.S. Department of Transportation announced its new National Strategy to Reduce 
Congestion on America's Transportation Network, which highlights "Four Ts" – tolling, 
transit, telecommuting and technology – as an approach to reducing traffic congestion. 
From the perspective of reducing congestion and pollution caused by vehicle miles 
traveled, a key policy question is what impact telecommuting has on total commute miles 
traveled.2 At first blush it would appear that greater telecommuting should decrease 
                                                
1 See their website http://www.telecommutect.com for more information about "Telecommute 
Connecticut!".
2 The impact of telecommuting on non-commute VMTs is another important topic but is beyond the scope 
of the dissertation. In theory, telecommuting could affect non-commute VMTs in multiple ways. For 
example, flexible working schedules allow telecommuters to go shopping or run errands more often. If the 
individual changes home location in response to telecommuting, her/his demand for non-commute travel is
likely to change as well. Walls and Safirova (2004) review a series of telecommuting papers and find no 
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commute miles. However, since telecommuting decreases the cost of commuting, it is 
plausible that telecommuting actually induces workers to work farther from home.  For 
example, a woman who works at home one day a week reduces her commuting costs by
20% compared to a non-telecommuter. The decline in commuting costs provides an
incentive for the woman to live farther away from her workplace or work farther from 
home. 
Telecommuting may not achieve its policy objectives if it leads to a longer journey 
to work. However, it is not easy to obtain a consistent estimate of the causal impact of 
telecommuting on commute length. For research purposes, the ideal situation would be to 
randomly assign the opportunity to telecommute to a panel of workers and then examine 
how often they telecommute and the length of their commutes before and after the 
intervention. However, this type of experiments have never been performed. Because 
commute length and the decision to telecommute are jointly determined, estimates of the 
impact of telecommuting on travel time may be biased. Yet, the direction of the bias is 
unclear. On one hand, workers who have longer commute distances may be more likely 
to telecommute. At the same time, people who have a distaste for commuting would, all 
else equal, live closer to work as well as welcome a telecommuting opportunity. 
In this paper, I examine the impact of telecommuting on total commute miles 
traveled while controlling for the endogeneity of the telecommuting decision.  Because 
                                                                                                                                                
study show evidence of significant increase in non-commute travel for telecommuters. However, a common 
shortcoming of those studies is that they are based on small samples of workers.
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information on whether an individual telecommutes and the length of his commute are 
not contained in one data set, I utilize the two-sample instrumental variables (TSIV) 
technique developed by Angrist and Krueger (1992). The key data sets include the work 
schedule supplement to the May 2001 Current Population Survey (CPS) that contains 
telecommuting data, and the 5-percent Public Use Micro-data Series (PUMS) of the 2000 
Census that contains information about one-way commute time and mode. An instrument 
is developed from the CPS sample that measures internet utilization for working at home 
for each 2-digit occupation and MSA-size combination. The instrument exploits the fact 
that certain occupations and MSA combinations are more open to telecommunication 
technology than others. These differences are by and large determined by job 
characteristics and internet infrastructure distribution, which, once I control for MSA and 
occupation fixed-effects, should be orthogonal to individuals' commutes. I also examine 
the effect of telecommuting on travel mode choice using the same method. 
It is well documented in the literature that men and women exhibit distinct 
commuting patterns (White 1977, 1986), especially with respect to marital status and 
family composition. I conjecture that telecommuting might have differential effects on 
married women and single women for the following reasons. First, in a dual-earner 
household, the woman is more often the secondary earner rather than the primary. She is 
more likely than her husband to have a part-time or lower-paying job. Therefore, 
commuting costs, which will be reduced by telecommuting, may be more important to 
her workplace location than to her husband’s. Second, the husband’s job situation is 
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likely to dominate the residential location of the household and affect the workplace 
location of the wife. Married women restrict the geographic ranges of their job search and 
often work closer to home than their husbands. People who are in occupations where 
telecommuting is an option will consider a larger range of workplace location than those 
who are not. Since married women may be more constrained in their job search than 
single women, telecommuting may have a larger impact on married women choosing 
workplace locations than on single women. Therefore, I estimate each model for men, 
married women and single women separately to explore the heterogeneity in the response 
across these demographic groups.3
TSIV estimates demonstrate that telecommuting has a large positive effect on 
commute length for married female workers: Married women tend to work farther from 
home when they can substitute working at home for commuting. Being able to 
telecommute causes married women to increase their one-way commute an additional 9-
12 minutes. This finding is consistent with the fact that married female workers have 
short commutes when telecommuting is not an option. The effect for male workers is 
smaller and statistically insignificant. For an average married women who works from 
home two out of five days a week, telecommuting reduces total commute miles, but not 
by 40 percent. My analysis also suggests that telecommuting is unlikely to affect the 
probability of a worker driving to work. 
                                                
3 It could be argued that women with children are more constrained in their choice of workplace location 
than women without children, regardless of marital status. When, however, the sample is split between 
women with and without children, the instrumental variable does not have enough explanatory power.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 defines telecommuting and 
provides background information about telecommuting and relevant studies. Section 2.3 
presents baseline estimates of the "effect" of telecommuting on journey-to-work from 
OLS analysis of the 2001 Nationwide Household Transportation Survey (NHTS). Section 
2.4 describes the identification strategy and the data. TSIV estimation results appear in 
Sections 2.5 and 2.6, with discussion and conclusions following in Sections 2.7 and 2.8.
2.2 Urban Problems and Telecommuting
Traffic congestion is a problem for many urban areas in the US and around the 
world. The social costs of having millions of cars stuck in traffic are high. The Texas 
Transportation Institute estimates that, in 2003, congestion in the 85 largest urban areas 
in the US caused 3.7 billion vehicle-hours of delay, resulting in a cost of $63 billion. 
According to Lomax and Schrank (2005), each rush hour traveler pays an annual 
congestion tax of $800 to $1,600 in lost time and fuel in the 10 most congested areas of 
the US. The costs of congestion extend to the environment as well. Automobile emissions 
are an important source of ozone precursors—nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs). In 2003 more than 100 million people lived in counties that violated 
the federal ozone standard (EPA, 2004). This is a serious public health problem since it is 
well established that ozone can induce respiratory symptoms, and cause decrements in 
lung function and inflammation of the airways (EPA, 2003).
While pricing instruments such as congestion tolls and gasoline taxes are a way to 
internalize the external costs of driving, they are unpopular in the US. More attention has 
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therefore been devoted to non-pricing strategies that control the demand for automobile 
travel directly. A subset of these strategies, Commute Trip Reduction (CTR) programs, 
focuses on commute trips, the largest contributor to rush hour traffic and one of the main 
contributors to the total vehicle miles traveled (VMT). These programs, often 
implemented through cooperation agreements between government authorities, 
employers and individuals, provide persuasion (e.g., Earth Day fairs), incentives (e.g., 
transit subsidies) and/or facilitate carpooling. Telecommuting is one of the most popular 
components of these programs (Pollution Probe 2001).
The literature has not settled on a consistent definition of telecommuting. Some 
studies include as telecommuters people who take work home and never substitute 
working from home for commuting on a work day. I refer to these people as teleworkers. 
Some research includes the self-employed who work at home sometimes as 
telecommuters. As a result, counts of telecommuters vary dramatically across studies. 
Mokhtarian et al. (2005) reviewed a number of papers using various data sets and 
concludes that the percentage of telecommuters in the late 1990s ranged from 3% to 20%. 
The latter figure includes the home-based self-employed and all teleworkers.
In this paper, I define a telecommuter as an employee who works at home instead of 
traveling to a workplace at least one day every two weeks. People who commute every 
day even though they sometimes work from home, as well as those who telecommute 
infrequently are not counted as telecommuters in my definition. My definition also 
excludes the self-employed since they are not the target population of TDM policy. 
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Finally, telecommuting does not require that the individual use information and 
communication technology (ICT) when working at home, although technology (ICT) 
plays a significant role in enhancing telecommuting opportunities.
The May 2001 CPS supplemental survey collected information about work schedules 
and working at home from 51,000 working adults from approximately 47,000 
households. The final CPS sample in this analysis consists of 29,147 workers who lived 
in an MSA and were not self-employed in their main jobs.4 Among them 1,138 were 
telecommuters, accounting for 4 percent of the sample. This figure falls at the low end of 
the range identified in Mokhtarian et al. (2005).  
Many studies of telecommuting have examined who telecommutes or why people 
telecommute.5 For instance, Drucker and Khattak (2000) found in the 1995 Nationwide 
Personal Transportation Survey sample that ceteris paribus, males, older people, those 
with more education, those with higher incomes, parents of young children, those in rural 
areas and those with inferior access to transit are more likely to telecommute. They also 
found that one-way commute distance negatively impacts the propensity to telecommute. 
Popuri and Bhat (2003) and Walls et al. (2007) analyzed large data sets from New York 
and Southern California, respectively. They confirmed the role of the aforementioned 
demographic characteristics in determining telecommuting status. In addition, they found 
                                                
4     Table A1 provides information on sample construction for both the May 2001 CPS sample and the 
2001 NHTS sample. 
5 The literature contains various definitions of telecommuting. For a comprehensive review, see Walls and 
Safirova (2004).
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that job types and employer characteristics such as employer size and industry have 
significant power in explaining telecommuting adoption. However, some variables such 
as home location and job tenure may be affected by telecommuting status as well. Using 
them directly as explanatory variables yields biased model estimates in these studies. 
2.3 Theory and Empirical Liteature
The question of interest here is what effects telecommuting has on workers' journey-
to-work, and, in particular, on commute length. A monocentric-city framework as 
described in Brueckner (2001) can be utilized to convey some simple intuition about the 
likely impact of telecommuting on commute length. Suppose two types of workers, 
commuters and telecommuters, live in a city where all employment is concentrated in the 
central business district (CBD). Telecommuters travel to the CBD for work only part of 
the week while commuters go five days a week. Because telecommuters have lower 
commuting costs than commuters, all else equal, they bid less for homes close to the 
CBD and more for homes in suburban areas than commuters. In equilibrium, commuters 
live close to the CBD and telecommuters sort into the surrounding region with longer 
commutes (see Appendix A for a formal exposition).
The monocentric model, though simple and stylized, predicts that telecommuting 
results in a longer commute distance due to a reduction in the marginal cost of 
commuting. In a more realistic model that features cities with multiple employment 
centers (Glaeser and Kahn 2001), the result may not be so straightforward. In a 
polycentric city, employers who are located farther from regions where potential 
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qualified employees live may use telecommuting as a tool in the recruitment (e.g.,
Prystash 1995, Guimaraes and Dallow 1999).  This would attract individuals who would 
choose to work near their homes if they had to commute everyday.  This seems 
particularly likely for married women who are more often the secondary earner of the 
family and, on average, have shorter commutes than their husbands. Thus, telecommuters 
could have longer commutes than non-telecommuters in a polycentric city if they choose 
an employer located farther from their home who offers telecommuting. 
The preceding discussion suggests that the impact of telecommuting on commute 
length is an empirical question. The difficulty of testing the hypothesis that 
telecommuting increases one-way commute distance lies in that telecommuting choice is 
unlikely to be exogenous to commuting preference and/or behavior. If original longer 
commute encourages an individual to work from home when allowed, a regression of 
commute length on telecommuting status will overestimate the effect of telecommuting. 
On the contrary, telecommuters could be those who feel more pressures from traffic. 
They would have shorter commutes in the absence of telecommuting opportunities. This 
unobserved selection will lead to a downward base in the regression estimates. The 
existing literature has started to notice the policy significance of the question, but has not 
addressed it satisfactorily. 
Earlier studies (e.g., Kitamura et al. 1991; Koening et al. 1996; Henderson and 
Mokhtarian 1996) found that telecommuting led to a large reduction in total VMTs. 
These studies all treat the decision to telecommute as exogenous. Among recent studies, 
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Mokhtarian et al. (2004) analyzed retrospective data from a survey of 218 California state 
government employees regarding their telecommuting and commuting behavior over a 
ten-year period, from 1988 to 1998. The authors found that telecommuters had higher 
one-way commuting lengths than non-telecommuters. Again, assuming telecommuting is 
an exogenous choice, the study was unable to tell whether longer commuting distances 
encouraged telecommuting or telecommuting facilitated residential relocation farther 
from work.  Ellen and Hempstead (2002) examined the correlation between 
telecommuting and city size using the work schedule supplement to the May 1997 CPS. 
Their results showed that telecommuters were more likely to live in large, high-density 
metropolitan areas. As the authors acknowledge, these results fail to shed light on a 
causal relationship: telecommuting opportunities were more likely to appear in 
information-intensive service businesses, which tend to concentrate in large, dense 
metropolitan areas.
2.4 The NHTS and an Empirical Baseline
The NHTS is a survey of the daily and long-distance travel behavior of the American 
public conducted periodically by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) since 
1969. In the 2001 NHTS, 69,817 households were interviewed. The survey collected 
detailed information about travel of all sorts including the journey to work. A 
shortcoming of the NHTS data is that it does not have much information about a 
respondent's job, so that it is difficult to instrument for telecommuting as I do below. I 
instead use the NHTS to generate a conditional correlation between telecommuting and 
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commute length, which sets a baseline for comparison with the two-sample instrumental 
variables estimates I obtain from the combined CPS and PUMS samples. 
The sample constructed from the 2001 NHTS includes individuals who lived in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) and had a job at the time of the survey. 
Unfortunately, the NHTS did not ask whether the individual was self-employed. The 
problem is mitigated by excluding those who always work at home or have no fixed 
workplace. A small portion of respondents with outlier values for commute length or 
speed are also removed from the sample.6 The final sample contains 47,730 individuals 
from 33,326 households. I treat as telecommuters those who substitute working from 
home for traveling to their usual workplace once every month or more. In this case, 
telecommuters constitute of 7.1 percent of the sample. This figure is higher than in the 
2001 CPS because the self-employed who work in a fixed place outside the home some 
days and at home other days are counted as telecommuters.7
Table 2-1 reports means and standard deviations of key variables for telecommuters 
and non-telecommuters in the NHTS sample. It is clear that the two groups of workers 
differ considerably in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Telecommuters 
                                                
6 As there is no way to identify whether outliers are due to misreporting, I employ conservative thresholds 
on commute length and speed in sample selection. Individuals reporting one-way commute time greater 
than 180 minutes, commute distance longer than 180 miles, or speed lower than 0.01 or greater than 1.5 
miles per minute are removed from the sample, which results in 189 exclusions.
7 Due to data constraint, the minimum frequency requirement (one day every month) in the NHTS 
definition is lower than that (one day every two weeks) of the CPS. Counting the self-employed, the 
percentage of telecommuters in the CPS goes up to 6.2. The difference in the definitions may explain part 
of the remaining gap. 
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are, on average, more likely to be male, white, older, better educated, more likely to be 
married, have young children and have higher household incomes compared to non-
telecommuters. Telecommuters are more concentrated in professional, managerial, or 
technical occupations than non-telecommuters. In terms of commuting patterns, an 
average telecommuter spends about 3.5 more minutes and travels an additional 2.6 miles 
for a one-way trip to his workplace than an average non-telecommuter. Figures 2-1 graph 
the distributions of commuters and telecommuters across groups defined by commuting 
distance or commuting time. The proportions of telecommuters that fall in groups with 
longer commutes are higher than the proportions of commuters in those groups. The last 
row of Table 2-1 shows that driving is the main travel mode for 92 percent of commuters. 
The proportion of workers commuting by car is 3 percentage points lower among 
telecommuters. 
A naïve approach to examining how telecommuting impacts the journey to work is to 
estimate a single-equation regression model with a commuting variable (i.e. length or 
travel mode) as the dependent variable and telecommuting status, together with other 
relevant variables, as the explanatory variables. Table 2-2 reports the OLS coefficient 
estimates of the telecommuting dummy. Telecommuting has a large positive effect on 
both commute time and commute distance for married women. A married female 
telecommuter is estimated to travel 3 minutes or 3 miles longer to work than a married 
female commuter, ceteris paribus. The estimates for single women and men are smaller 
and statistically indistinguishable from zero. In terms of travel mode, telecommuters, 
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except for single women, are less likely by 4 – 5 percentage points—to drive to work 
than the average commuter. However, none of these results should be interpreted as the 
causal effects of telecommuting as it is likely that people choose telecommuting based on 
how far and by which means they commute. The confounding factors would cause OLS 
estimates to be biased and the direction of the bias is unclear. To obtain consistent 
estimates of the impacts of telecommuting on the journey-to-work, we need to instrument 
for telecommuting choice.
The coefficient estimates for other variables indicate that commute lengths as well as 
probability of driving to work increase with age (at a decreasing rate), education, and 
household income across different population groups. Black workers commute longer 
than white, Hispanic and Asian workers, as is documented in the spatial mismatch 
literature (e.g., Kain 1968). Married men commute longer than single men. The variables 
have qualitatively the same effects on the probability of driving to work. 
2.5 Empirical Strategy
2.5.1 Instrumental Variable
The opportunities for teleworking and telecommuting vary substantially from job to 
job because of the variation in the relative productivity of working from home to working 
on-site, which is generally determined by the need for face-to-face communication with 
colleagues and customers, as well as the need for team-work. The application of 
telecommunication technology during teleworking could alter the substitutability of 
teleworking for face-to-face contact. For some jobs, internet technology maintains or 
20
even increases the productivity of employees working from home, while for others, it 
appears less helpful. The employees in the former case are likely to have more options for
teleworking and telecommuting. While a variable measuring the occupational technology 
penetration for teleworking may explain individual’s telecommuting choice, some 
unobserved occupational characteristics that affect commute length might be correlated 
with that variable. For instance, a high school teacher uses the internet less often when 
she works at home than a college professor does. Furthermore, there are more high 
schools geographically scattered in a city than colleges. An instrumental variable that 
shows that a high school teacher has fewer telecommuting opportunities may also capture
the difference in the geographical distributions of the two jobs if the latter is not well 
measured or controlled for in the model. 
In the early 2000s internet services, and in particular the broadband capacity, were 
not evenly distributed across the country. Some studies show that internet infrastructure 
investment or city accessibility to the internet was biased toward larger metropolitan 
areas and a group of midsized urban areas (e.g. Malecki, 2002; Grubesic and O'Kelly, 
2002). Consequently, the competitiveness of the broadband market varied considerably 
across regions. The Federal Communications Commissions (2002) shows that 40.5% of 
zip codes had none or one broadband line, in contrast to 27.6% of zip codes with four or 
more high-speed lines by June 2001. The number of broadband providers increased with 
population density (Grubesic and Murray, 2004), and rural and smaller metropolitan 
areas failed to attract significant levels of competition. The spatial variation in the 
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internet and broadband markets could have led to spatial differences in technology 
options for teleworking for different occupations. 
Thus, I develop an instrumental variable to measure the penetration of internet for 
teleworking across occupation and city size using the work schedule supplement to the 
May 2001 CPS, from which we know whether a respondent ever worked at home and 
what equipment they used when they were working at home. I calculate the percentage of 
employees for each of 270 (45 x 6) occupation-by-MSA-size combinations who ever 
worked at home and used the internet (hereafter referred to as internet penetration). The 
higher the value, the more likely a person in the occupation-by-city-size cell is to work 
from home and possibly telecommute. The advantage of exploiting the variation in the 
interaction of occupation and city size is that the effects of unmeasured occupation and 
urban structure attributes on commuting behavior can be purged by the introduction of 
occupation and city fixed effects in the model. To ensure measurement accuracy, the 
occupation-by-city-size cells with fewer than 50 observations are not used in the baseline 
analysis. This results in 179 cells covering 37 occupations and 6 MSA sizes. The cell-size 
weighted mean (standard deviation) of internet penetration is 0.088 (0.113). In the 
sensitivity analysis, I lower the cell selection criterion to 30 observations. 
Figure 2-2 shows that internet penetration varies substantially across both 
occupations and city sizes. In general, white-collar workers such as professionals, 
teachers, and sales representatives have higher average internet penetration as well as 
larger variation across city sizes than blue-collar workers such as mechanics and 
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repairmen, or transportation and production workers. College teachers and lawyers and 
judges have the highest teleworking internet penetration (0.5 or above), which seems 
reasonable since these two occupations are information intensive as well as flexible in 
where work is performed. Sales in finance, business and non-retail commodities have 
much higher percentages of internet-using teleworkers than retail sales probably because 
the latter require personal presence and more face-to-face interaction with customers.
It is plausible to assume that the instrumental variable is not systematically 
correlated with other unobservables that affect commuting behavior conditional on the 
occupation and city fixed effects. However, to address the concern about this assumption, 
I also construct a set of variables at the occupation-by-city level with the PUMS and test 
how robust the instrumental variable estimates are to including these variables. More 
detail about the occupation-by-city variables and the test is presented in the next section.
2.5.2 The Two-Sample Instrumental Variables (TSIV) Method
Traditionally, instrumental variables estimation is performed when the outcome 
variable, the potentially endogenous variable of interest and the instrumental variable 
exist in one data set. In addition, a large sample is generally needed for IV estimation to 
produce sufficient statistical power. In our case, the instrumental variable discussed 
above is measured for two-digit occupation by city size. It cannot be assigned to the 
NHTS sample because the NHTS contains little information about respondents’ jobs. (A 
five-category variable is used to describe occupation as opposed to 45 two-digit 
occupations in the CPS.) To the best of my knowledge, there is no other (large) data set 
23
that contains information on commuting, telecommuting, occupation and MSA of 
residence.8 Therefore, a traditional instrumental variable method is infeasible here.  
Angrist and Krueger (1992) developed a two-sample instrumental variables (TSIV) 
technique that allows one to apply IV estimation to a joint sample with two data sets, one
of which has the outcome and the instrumental variable and the other the endogenous 
explanatory variable and the instrument. The work schedule supplement to the May 2001 
CPS collected information about respondents’ working at home, occupation and MSA. 
The 2000 5% PUMS collected information about journey-to-work as well as occupation 
and MSA. Moreover, they were both intended to represent the US population within the 
same period and contain many of the same questions. Thus, they constitute a suitable case 
for the TSIV method to work. 
Formally, suppose the model of interest is
,y X   
where y   and    are  1n   vectors and X  is an n k  matrix of regressors, some of 
which are correlated with  . An n l  ( l k ) matrix Z is needed to consistently estimate 
 , where Z  is not correlated with   and  lim / 0
n
p Z X n

  . Angrist and Krueger point 
out that in the case when only X  and Z  (but not y ) are observed in one data set and 
only y  and Z (but not X ) are observed in the other,    can still be consistently 
estimated when certain assumptions, which will be discussed in detail in the next 
                                                
8 The NLSY79, an alternative data set, provides only commuting time in the early 1990s for fewer than 
10,000 workers. The information about telecommuting in the NLSY79 is limited to hours worked at home.
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subsection, hold for the two samples. Many researchers have since used the two-sample 
approach (e.g., Currie and Yelowitz 2000, Dee and Evans 2003) to circumvent the data 
constraint. In practice, a two-stage least squares procedure is usually adopted to produce 
the following estimator
  12 2 2 2TSIV X X X y

 
   
,9
where   12 2 1 1 1 1X Z Z Z Z X


, 1X  and 1Z  are from the first sample, and 2y  and 2Z  are 
from the second. 
Now suppose equation (2-1) describes the structural model of commute length (or 
mode):
ikc ikc ikc k c ikcy a W B T u                                                   (2-1)
where ikcy  is the commute time or travel mode of  individual i  living in MSA c  with 
occupation k , ikcW  is a vector of individual specific exogenous variables, k  and cv  are 
occupation and MSA fixed effects, and ikcu  is idiosyncratic disturbance. The potentially 
endogenous variable, ikcT , is an indicator for telecommuting. The parameter of interest, 
 , measures the causal impact of telecommuting on commute length or travel mode.
The first stage in calculating the TSIV estimate of   is to estimate a model of 
telecommuting adoption as described by equation (2-2),
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,ikc ikc ks k c ikcT a W B Z u        11, ,i n                       (2-2)
                                                
9 Inoue and Solon (2005) called this estimator the two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) estimator 
and showed that it is different from the TSIV estimator originally proposed by Angrist and Krueger. They 
proved that the TS2SLS estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the TSIV estimator. That being said, 
I continue to label the estimator TSIV to distinguish it from the one-sample IV approach.
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where the subscript 1 denotes the CPS sample, 1n  is the sample size in the CPS, and ksZ
is the instrumental variable measured at occupation by MSA size level ( s ).  The 
parameters estimates are applied to the second sample, i.e. the PUMS sample, to predict 
telecommuting status, 2ikcT

. In the second stage, the TSIV estimate of   is generated by 
regressing the outcome variables in the PUMS, 2ikcy , on the predicted telecommuting 
status, 2ikcT

 and other covariates. In an exactly identified case such as ours, we can 
alternatively fit a reduced-form equation, i.e. equation (2-3), using the PUMS sample,
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ,ikc ikc ks k c ikcy a W B Z u        21, ,i n                   (2-3)
where subscript 2 denotes the PUMS sample and 2n  is the sample size of the PUMS. The 
TSIV estimate is just the ratio between the reduced-form and first-stage coefficients 








Standard errors of the TSIV estimator can be computed using a linear Taylor series 

































 TSIV                                     (2-4)
where 1̂  and 2̂  are estimated standard errors of 1̂  and 2̂ , respectively.
10
                                                
10
Note that with this approximation formula the t-statistic of the TSIV estimates is the following function 











. When 1t , the first-stage t-
statistic outweighs 2t , TSIVt  approaches 2t .
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2.5.3 CPS and PUMS Samples
In addition to assumptions underlying the traditional IV model, the TSIV approach 
imposes some conditions on the joint sample. The key one is that the two data sets must 
represent the same population. It is plausible to argue that these conditions hold for the 
samples constructed from the CPS and the PUMS.  The CPS is administered by the 
Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The former is also in charge of 
implementing the decennial census of the US, from which the PUMS was created.  Both 
the CPS and the PUMS collected a rich set of information from US households on 
individuals’ demographic characteristics, labor force experience, household attributes and 
economic status. In addition to the similarity in content, the phrasing of questions and 
coding of potential responses are similar across the CPS and the PUMS. While the CPS 
and PUMS are both intended to be representative of the US population, the PUMS 
includes institutionalized individuals, who are excluded from the CPS. I remove these 
observations from the PUMS in constructing the joint sample. Moreover, every variable 
in the sample is ensured to have the same support across the two sources. For instance, 
only workers who are 16 years old or above, live in an MSA and are not self-employed 
on the main job are retained in my data. MSAs that appear in just one data set are 
removed. The final data includes 234 common MSAs. 
Nevertheless, potential mismatches between the CPS and the PUMS might exist due 
to the differences in sampling design, response rates and survey times. The CPS selects 
households by primary sampling units (PSUs) based on the 1990 Census while the PUMS 
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draws households with sampling rates varying with the housing density of census blocks 
or tracts.11 Second, the Census spent tremendous effort to induce people to fill out the 
survey forms, which led to higher response rates in the Census than the CPS.  Finally, the 
CPS data were collected in May 2001 roughly one year after the 2000 Census was 
conducted. A visual comparison of the weighted means12 of the CPS and the PUMS 
samples does not suggest significant differences for most variables between the samples. 
However, t-tests reject the mean equality for several variables across the two samples.13
Table 2-3 presents descriptive statistics for telecommuters and non-telecommuters in 
the CPS sample. Telecommuters are 3 – 4 years older than commuters on average, and 
disproportionately white and better educated. They are more likely to be married and live 
in smaller households, with higher annual incomes. In terms of job types, telecommuters 
are concentrated in occupations such as executives, administrators, managers, math and 
computer scientists, teachers of all levels, lawyers and judges, and sales representatives in 
finance and business services—workers who are generally in the upper levels of the job 
hierarchy. White-collar workers in the service sector and blue-collar workers have fewer
                                                
11 See http://usa.ipums.org/usa/chapter2/chapter2.shtml for a detailed explanation.
12 Sample weights contained in the CPS and PUMS are applied in calculating summary statistics and 
estimation to adjust the over-sampling in each survey. 
13 In the notation of section 2.5.2, the condition on the joint sample can be formally written as
   
1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2lim / lim / ZX
n n
p Z X n p Z X n
 
    .
It requires that the first and second moments of explanatory variables including the instrumental variable of
the two samples converge to the same matrix. It can be tested for the variables that are observed in both 
samples. A t-test on the means just examines the first moment and is likely to reject the null given large 
sample size. With increasing applications of the TSIV method, formal ways to test the assumption and to 
evaluate the potential bias resulting from mismatch of the two samples are probably desirable.
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opportunities to telecommute. Finally, a higher proportion of telecommuters than non-
telecommuters live in large MSAs with populations over one million. As in Table 2-1, 
Table 2-3 shows that telecommuters and non-telecommuters differ in many observed 
ways. It is therefore likely that they also differ in unobserved variables that are correlated 
with commuting behavior.
In the PUMS, commute length is recorded in minutes and measures how long it 
usually took the respondent to get from home to work during the past week. White 
(1988a) argues that time is a better measure of commuting costs than distance because 
time is the scarce resource that people economize. Moreover, Table 2-2 shows that the 
same set of variables explains more variation in commute time than commute distance, 
This suggests that the noise associated with distance is larger than with time: A commuter 
can estimate commuting time more accurately than distance. The translation of the 
impact of telecommuting on commute time into an impact on commute distance is 
considered below. 
In the PUMS, 1.7 percent of the sample or over 60,000 respondents have travel times 
that are top-coded at 99 minutes. Exploiting the properties of the Pareto distribution, I 
replace the top-coded values with an estimate of the conditional expectation for top-
coded values.  The procedure is described in Appendix B, which suggests a range for the 
imputed values of 120 to 165 minutes. I use the lower bound, 120 minutes, in the 
benchmark analysis. Since the likelihood of being top-coded is positively correlated with 
telecommuting adoption, using the lower bound value works against finding a positive 
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effect of telecommuting. I check whether different imputed values affect the results in the 
sensitivity analysis. The weighted average commute times in the PUMS are 24.2, 24.7 
and 27.5 minutes for married women, single women and men, respectively. These figures 
are slightly higher than in the NHTS sample, which are 22.1, 22.9 and 25.2, respectively. 
In the PUMS, a higher share (93.3%) of married women drives to work than single 
women (85.1%) and men (89.8%). Similar patterns are observed in the NHTS sample, for 
which the shares are 94.1%, 87.7%, and 91.7%, respectively.
2.6 The First-Stage Estimates
In the first stage, I estimate a linear probability model of telecommuting adoption 
(equation (2-2)). The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the worker is 
telecommuting. In the baseline model, the explanatory variables include age, age squared, 
gender, race, educational achievement, number of household members, presence of 
children 5 years of age or younger, children between 6 and 15 years of age, spouse (for 
the male sample only), annual household income, and the occupation-by-city-size internet 
penetration measure. Industry and job class variables are not included in the model 
because they are individual choices that are likely to be correlated with home location, 
work location or commute length. Neither the wage, housing price, or travel mode and 
time is used as an explanatory variable.  All of these are chosen simultaneously with 
commute length and, therefore, are endogenous. Fixed effects for MSA-of-residence and 
2-digit occupation category are controlled for, assuming people do not sort into a city and
2-digit occupation based on their preferences for commute length or telecommuting. 
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The model is estimated for married women, single women and men separately using 
individual weights provided by the CPS. Results are reported in Table 2-4. In general, the 
estimates reflect the differences between telecommuters and commuters in Table 2-3. 
People who are older, white, possess a college or advanced degree, have children and 
come from affluent households are more likely to telecommute. Less obvious from the 
descriptive statistics is that black employees have a higher probability of working at 
home than other groups, although a lower probability than whites. Being married does 
not seem to play a role in the telecommuting decisions for male employees. All else 
equal, telecommuting is significantly more popular among professionals and sales 
representatives in finance and business services, but less popular among engineers and 
supervisors. Surprisingly, blue-collar workers are not less likely to telecommute than 
white collar workers, conditional on demographic and economic covariates. This may be 
because people with less education are offered more telecommuting opportunities when 
working in blue-collar jobs than in white-collar jobs.  
Several variables have differing influences on telecommuting adoption across the 
samples. Race plays an important role in telecommuting for married women but not for 
single women. In contrast, household size and income are more important for the latter 
than for the former. The likelihood of telecommuting increases with age at a decreasing 
rate for women workers. This pattern is much weaker and statistically insignificant for 
men. A male employee with a graduate degree has a substantially larger propensity to 
telecommute than one with a college degree, but this is not the case for a female 
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employee. Men tend to work at home if there are older children but not younger children 
in the household. The reverse is true for married women – suggesting that married 
women may use telecommuting as a way to combine work and childcare. 
The coefficients on the instrumental variables are of paramount importance and vary 
substantially across samples. In the case of married women, a 10 percentage point 
increase in occupation/MSA internet penetration causes the probability of telecommuting 
to rise by 5.4 percentage points once 2-digit occupation and MSA fixed effects are 
controlled for. This effect is statistically significant at the1% level. On the contrary, the 
estimate for single women is smaller (0.143) and statistically insignificant, suggesting the 
instrumental variable has little explanatory power for single women employees. For male 
employees, a 10 percentage point increase in internet penetration increases the probability 
of telecommuting by 2.9 percentage points, an effect that is significant at the 5% level.
One critical assumption underlying the IV approach is that teleworking technology 
penetration is not correlated with any unobservable that influences commute length or 
mode. There might be concerns that the instrumental variable is correlated with 
occupation-specific local labor market conditions. For instance, the urban economics 
literature hypothesizes that individuals are forward looking when they choose home 
location and commute length. They take into account labor market dynamics and 
potential moving costs. Specifically, Crane (1996) predicts a shorter commute for persons 
with lower probability of changing jobs within the local labor market. Likewise, van 
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Ommeren et al. (1997) argue that commuting distance is decreasing in the arrival rates of 
job offers and increasing in moving costs.
One way to deal with this concern is to control in the model for occupation-by-city 
attributes. Lacking clear theory informing what those attributes should be, I construct a 
rich set of covariates using the PUMS data. I calculate the fraction of employees within 
each 2-digit occupation and MSA combination who are: male, white, black, have a high 
school degree, some college experience, a college degree, an advanced degree (omitting 
high school dropouts), in the transportation and communication industries, in trade, in 
finance, in services, in public administration (omitting the manufacturing and 
construction industries), working for private for profit employers, and working for private 
non-profit employers (omitting government). I also compute the labor market share, 
median hourly wage, and difference between the 75th percentile wage and the 25th
percentile wage of each occupation by MSA. Finally, using the CPS sample, I calculate 
the fraction of employees for each 2-digit occupation and MSA size combination who 
have flexible work hours. 
Even columns in Table 2-4 report estimation results for the model with inclusion of 
these occupation-city specific covariates. The coefficients of demographic and household 
variables do not change much, although some occupation fixed effects vary. This 
suggests that the constructed covariates pick up part of the variation in telecommuting 
explained by occupation. The coefficient on internet penetration declines slightly to 0.48 
for married women while statistical significance is maintained at the 1% level. The 
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coefficient for men is unchanged up to two decimal places. These results indicate that the 
instrumental variable is likely to be orthogonal to the local labor market conditions 
described by those covariates. 
2.7 Reduced-Form and TSIV Estimates
2.7.1 Reduced-Form Estimates
Equation (2-3) is estimated only for married women and men since the instrumental 
variable is not statistically significant for single women. The exogenous explanatory 
variables are the same as in the first-stage except that they are from the PUMS sample. 
Results are reported in Table 2-5. In the baseline model, commute length increases with 
age at a decreasing rate for both women and men. Race makes a substantial difference in 
commute length, which may reflect residential segregation and employment separation. 
Black male workers on average spend 2 more minutes on the road than white and other 
workers and black females travel 4 minutes longer than white females. Regardless of 
gender, college graduates and those from high-income households live farther from their 
workplace than employees without a college degree and workers from low income 
households. Married men travel 1 minute longer to work than single men. When there are 
younger children in the household, both married women and men travel longer to work, 
while the presence of older children has the opposite, but smaller, effect for women. 
Commute time increases with the number of household members for men and decreases 
for married women. Overall, the results are consistent with those from the NHTS and 
largely agree with those in White (1986). Commute length varies significantly across jobs 
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even conditioning on factors like age, race, and education. One possible reason is the 
variation in geographic concentrations of different occupations. For example, school 
teachers have short commutes because schools are scattered throughout a city. 
The instrumental variable shows large positive impacts on married women's 
commute lengths but not on men's commute lengths. In the baseline model without 
controlling for occupation-MSA covariates, i.e., Columns 1 and 3, a 10 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of employees of each 2-digit occupation and MSA size 
combination who ever use internet when working at home leads to 0.60 minute longer 
commuting trip for married women. The estimate is statistically significant. In contrast,
the coefficient estimate of the internet penetration for male workers is 0.13 minutes and 
statistical insignificant. 
When the occupation-by-city covariates are controlled for in the model, few changes 
occur in the coefficients of the demographic and household variables. However, a number 
of occupation fixed effects vary dramatically. This suggests the importance of 
heterogeneity in local markets for different occupations in determining commute length. 
The coefficients of the occupation-MSA covariates imply that conditional on individual 
characteristics, commute length increases if the person works in an occupation that has 
more human capital, is concentrated in finance and services industries, is more 
represented in the private for profit sector and has a larger labor market share. The last 
result seems to be consistent with Crane’s theory that a person values commuting 
distance less if more potential employers are available. 
35
The effect of internet penetration on commuting length declines slightly and retains 
statistical significance for married female workers. Now, a 10 percentage point increases 
in internet penetration lead to an additional 0.46 minutes in commute time for married 
women. The estimate for male workers is less than 0.2 minutes and statistically 
insignificant. The results, consistent with those without occupation-by-city covariates, 
suggest that the instrumental variable is unlikely to pick up the occupation-city specific 
attributes as confounding factors.
2.7.2 TSIV Estimates of the Effects on Commute Length
First-stage estimates indicate that the internet penetration instrumental variable has 
statistically significant and positive impacts on the telecommuting status of married 
women and men in the 2001 May CPS. The reduced-form estimates indicate that the 
instrumental variable has a substantial positive effect on one-way commute time of 
married women but little effect for male employees in the 2000 PUMS. The TSIV 
procedure ties these two sets of results together to generate consistent estimates of the 
causal effects of telecommuting on commute length. 
Table 2-6a presents the TSIV estimates calculated as the ratios of reduced-form 
estimates to the first-stage estimates of the instrumental variable. In the exactly identified
case, it yields the same estimates as the two-stage least square estimation in the two 
sample case (TS2SLS). The standard errors of the TSIV estimates are computed using
equation (2-4). The TSIV estimates suggest that telecommuting has a substantial positive 
impact on married women’s commute lengths. All else equal, working at home at least 
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one day every two weeks, on average, causes a married women employee to commute 9 –
11 minutes longer than if she commutes every day. The impact for male employees is 
smaller in magnitude (around 5 minutes) and statistically indistinguishable from zero. In 
comparison with OLS estimates, the TSIV estimates yield qualitatively similar results. 
However, OLS results underestimate the effect of telecommuting for married women, 
which is consistent with the fact that married women usually have short commutes if they 
do not telecommute.
2.7.3 Effects of Telecommuting on Commute Mode
OLS analysis of the NHTS data shows that male and married female telecommuters 
are less likely to drive to work than non-telecommuters. It is difficult to find a compelling 
reason why telecommuting leads people to forego driving to work. The OLS estimates 
are susceptible to an omitted variable bias that fails to account for sorting of women who 
take public transit to work into telecommuting. Moreover, driving usually is faster than 
taking public transit or any other travel mode.14 If telecommuting does cause a worker to 
commute by a mode other than driving, the lengthened commute time might be a result of 
choosing a slower travel mode rather than an increase in commute distance. Therefore, it 
is important to identify the true effect of telecommuting on commute mode. 
I apply the same TSIV procedure to the travel mode variable available in the PUMS 
sample. Using the same argument that internet penetration is unlikely to affect travel 
                                                
14 The average speeds for commuting by driving, by rail, by bus, and by bicycle in the NHTS are 0.53, 0.36, 
0.28, and 0.23 miles per minute, respectively.
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mode choice directly, TSIV produces consistent estimates of the effects of telecommuting 
on travel mode choice. Table 2-6b reports both reduced-form and TSIV estimates for 
travel mode. In the baseline model, the TSIV estimates are small, positive and without 
statistical significance for both married women and men. When the occupation-by-city 
covariates are added, the estimate for married women is almost zero while the estimate 
for men becomes negative with a large standard error. Overall, the TSIV point estimates
do not support the OLS results that telecommuting reduces a married woman’s 
probability of driving to work. The negative OLS estimates could result from the fact that 
employees who commute by public transit also prefer to telecommute. However, the 
TSIV estimates are not sufficiently precise to let us draw definite conclusions about the 
effect. 
2.7.4 Sensitivity Analysis
I examine the sensitivity of the above results to different sample restrictions and 
alternative imputed values for the top-coded commute times. Tables 2-7a and 2-7b report 
the estimates for the commute time and travel mode models, respectively. In Panel A of 
each table, the samples are extended to include the occupation-MSA size cells that 
contain 30 or more CPS observations, which results in 216 cells covering 38 2-digit 
occupations and 6 MSA sizes. In the first stage, the instrumental variable has a smaller 
effect for married women while the coefficient for men does not change much as 
compared to the case with cells containing over 50 observations. It continues to have a 
large, statistically significant reduced-form effect on married women's commute time and 
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little effect on men's commute time. The TSIV estimates show that telecommuting 
increases married women's commute time by 13 minutes though they lack enough 
statistical power in the case with job-by-city covariates included. The effect of 
telecommuting among male employees falls to 3 and 4 minutes, and the t-statistics are 
less than 1. As far as travel mode is concerned, telecommuting shows some positive 
effects for both married women and men, but again the estimates are not distinguishable 
from zero. These results are highly consistent with the baseline case with cells larger than 
50 observations.
Telecommuting is often thought of as a choice for office workers only. Programs and 
policies that aim at promoting telecommuting usually target these occupations rather than 
the entire working population. Therefore, it may be of interest to examine the effects of 
telecommuting on commuting behavior for office workers. One way to define office 
workers is to narrow the sample down to the 2-digit occupations coded 1 through 26. 
Included in this group are managerial, professional specialty, technical, sales, and 
administrative support occupations. 2-digit occupation codes greater than 26, including
service, precision production, craft, repair, farming, forestry and fishing occupations and 
operators, fabricators and laborers, are excluded. Panels B of Tables 2-7a and 2-7b 
present the estimates for the sample of office workers. The instrumental variable affects 
only the telecommuting propensity of married women. Telecommuting is estimated to 
lengthen the one-way commute time of married women by 8 - 9 minutes, which is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Again, telecommuting has a positive but 
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statistically insignificant effect on married women’s commute mode, contrary to the OLS 
estimates. In sum, estimates with different sample restrictions demonstrate that the effects 
of telecommuting on commuting show stability and a certain degree of homogeneity 
across occupations. Panel C of Table 2-7a shows that replacing the top-coded commute 
time by 165 minutes instead of 120 minutes has no impact on the effects of 
telecommuting on commute time.
2.8 Discussion
The TSIV estimates of the effects of telecommuting on commute time for married 
women equal 9 to 12 minutes, which are 3 to 4 times the OLS estimates from the NHTS. 
The results are plausible in that married women have shorter commutes on average. The 
OLS analysis tends to underestimate the effects of telecommuting in this case.  The 
magnitude of the adjustment in the commute made by married women appear reasonable
given that the average commute time for married women in the PUMS is 24.2 minutes 
with a standard deviation of 19. TSIV estimates suggest that telecommuting increases 
commute time by about half of a standard deviation. 
TSIV estimation could be biased if the internet penetration measured by occupation 
crossed with MSA size is correlated with some unobservables that impact individual 
commute lengths. The concern may be less serious as the models control for a rich set of 
occupation-by-city specific covariates as well as occupation and city fixed effects. 
Another potential source of bias is that the teleworking technology penetration is 
measured with 2001 CPS data. When internet access expanded rapidly to a wider 
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population and more regions in the early 2000s, the variation across occupation and cities 
declined quickly with time. Therefore, the impact of internet penetration on 
telecommuting adoption estimated using 2001 data may underestimate the impact in year 
2000 when the PUMS were collected, which would result in an overestimation of the 
TSIV coefficients.
I am interested in translating the effects of telecommuting on commute time into the 
effects on commute distance. I use the NHTS data to estimate a relationship between 
commute time and distance for people driving to work. Table 2-8 shows the coefficients 
of models that project commute time onto commute distance and distance squared.15
Commute time is a concave function of distance with an intercept greater than zero, 
which suggests a positive fixed cost and an increasing marginal speed. The relationship 
between commute time and distance varies by sex, with women having greater concavity. 
Using these estimates, we can recover the approximate distance from travel time. For 
instance, suppose a woman drove 24 minutes to work before choosing to telecommute. 
Applying the projection estimates implies that on average her commute distance was 13
miles. If her one-way commute time increases to 33 minutes after telecommuting, the 
one-way commute time increases to 20.5 miles, a 7.5 miles increase. If she works from 
home 2 days a week (the national average for telecommuting women is 2.2 days per 
week), the total weekly commutes are 198 minutes or 123 miles, representing 17 percent 
                                                
15 Higher order polynomials were tried. They produce very bad predictions for distances on the high end. 
Moreover, the predictions for the mid-range values do not differ with and without the higher order terms. 
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and 5.5 percent declines relative to the before-telecommuting commute times and 
commute miles, respectively.
2.9 Conclusion
Telecommuting has been promoted as a means to deal with congestion and 
automobile emissions by researchers and public policy makers. However, there are
concerns that telecommuting workers will make a longer commute in response to the 
lower commute frequency. Naïve (OLS) estimates based on the NHTS show that a 
married woman commutes 3 minutes or 3 miles longer if she telecommutes. The NHTS 
estimates also show that telecommuters except single women are less likely to drive to 
work than non-telecommuters. However, these estimates could be biased because 
telecommuting is not randomly assigned among workers. Furthermore, theory cannot 
predict the direction of the bias. 
By applying two-sample instrumental variables technique to the CPS and PUMS 
samples, I find that telecommuting causes married women employees’ commuting trips 
to increase by 9 to 12 minutes. The effect for male workers is also positive, but smaller 
and not precisely estimated. For single women, the instrumental variable does not have 
enough power to explain telecommuting choice. In addition, TSIV estimates show a 
small, positive effect of telecommuting on the probability of commuting by car for 
married women. Although lacking statistical power, this does not agree with the negative 
relationship between telecommuting and driving to work found in the OLS analysis. 
Given the sizable “rebound” effect on one-way commute time found among married 
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women, the total commute miles traveled by an average married women worker are 
unlikely to decline in proportion to telecommuting frequency. 
Unfortunately, the instrumental variable developed in this paper does not have 
enough information to let us estimate the effects of telecommuting for men and single 
women. This needs to be explored in future research. Moreover, to understand whether
telecommuters adjust their commute distance by changing residential location or 
employment location is important for both research and policy purposes and should also 
be examined.
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Figures and Tables for Chapter 2
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Source: Author's calculation using NHTS 2001.
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Figure 2-2. Internet Penetration by 2-Digit Occupation and MSA size (2001 CPS)
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Note: Internet penetration is calculated as the weighted percentage of employees who ever work at home 
and use the internet within each occupation-by-MSA-size cell using data from the Work Schedule 
Supplement to the May 2001 CPS.
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Table 2-1. Descriptive Statistics of NHTS Sample
Non-telecommuters Telecommuters
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Raw N 44556 3174
Age 39.205 12.370 42.250 11.243
Male 0.541 0.498 0.599 0.490
White 0.708 0.455 0.807 0.395
Black 0.123 0.329 0.060 0.238
Asian 0.029 0.168 0.044 0.206
Hispanic 0.110 0.313 0.056 0.231
High School Degree 0.290 0.454 0.111 0.314
Some College 0.303 0.460 0.252 0.434
College Degree 0.216 0.411 0.369 0.483
Graduate Degree 0.115 0.319 0.248 0.432
Spouse 0.608 0.488 0.664 0.472
Child Age 0 – 5 in HH 0.211 0.408 0.225 0.418
Child Age 6 – 15 in HH 0.310 0.463 0.312 0.464
Household Size 3.152 1.441 2.990 1.364
HH Income $40 – 70K 0.322 0.467 0.233 0.423
HH Income $70 – 100K 0.191 0.393 0.256 0.437
HH Income > $100K 0.152 0.359 0.343 0.475
Sales or Services 0.266 0.442 0.236 0.425
Clerical or Administrative 
Support 0.136 0.342 0.059 0.236
Manufacturing, Construction, 
Maintenance, or Framing 0.180 0.384 0.061 0.239
Professional, Managerial, or 
Technical 0.417 0.493 0.644 0.479
Time to Work 23.688 17.889 27.167 22.362
Distance to Work 12.628 12.800 15.238 16.194
Drive to Work 0.917 0.276 0.884 0.321
Note: Sample is constructed from the 2001 NHTS including workers who live in an MSA, have an 
outside-home fixed workplace, and have one-way commute distance less than 180 miles, commute time 
less than 180 minutes and commute speed less than 1.5 miles per minute and greater than 0.01 miles per 
minute. Observations with missing values for any of the listed variables are also dropped. Means and 
standard deviations are calculated using the weights from the NHTS.
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Table 2-2. OLS Estimates of the "Effect" of Telecommuting on Commute Lengths and 






Telecommuting (1) (2) (3)
A. COMMUTE TIME (MINUTES)
Coefficient 2.904** 0.452 1.652
Standard Error (1.225) (1.410) (1.040)
R-sq 0.11 0.12 0.08
B. COMMUTE DISTANCE (MILES)
Coefficient 3.124*** 1.063 1.144
Standard Error (0.968) (1.010) (0.699)
R-sq 0.09 0.09 0.05
C. DRIVE TO WORK
Coefficient -0.043** 0.013 -0.051***
Standard Error (0.019) (0.025) (0.014)
R-squared 0.11 0.17 0.13
# Observations 14176 8939 24615
Note: The sample is the same as in Table 2-1. All models include 
age, age squared, race, education, household composition, annual 
household income, and job category and MSA fixed effects.
Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors without clustering are in 
parentheses. * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
and *** significant at 1%.
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Variables Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Raw N 13528 594 14481 544
Age 38.678 12.806 41.663 10.829 38.437 12.614 43.020 11.367
White 0.795 0.404 0.886 0.318 0.833 0.373 0.921 0.271
Black 0.148 0.355 0.081 0.273 0.111 0.314 0.045 0.208
High School Degree 0.285 0.452 0.139 0.346 0.283 0.450 0.096 0.295
Some College 0.314 0.464 0.227 0.419 0.272 0.445 0.175 0.381
College Degree 0.204 0.403 0.399 0.490 0.201 0.401 0.416 0.493
Graduate Degree 0.086 0.281 0.202 0.402 0.095 0.293 0.300 0.459
Spouse Present 0.501 0.500 0.642 0.480 0.577 0.494 0.730 0.444
With Child 0 – 5 in HH. 0.194 0.395 0.222 0.416 0.221 0.415 0.196 0.397
With Child 6 – 15 in HH. 0.327 0.469 0.338 0.474 0.314 0.464 0.320 0.467
Household Size 3.076 1.495 3.029 1.444 3.236 1.592 2.924 1.426
Annual Family Income < $40K 0.364 0.481 0.163 0.369 0.320 0.467 0.087 0.282
Annual Family Income $40 – 75K 0.337 0.473 0.310 0.463 0.355 0.479 0.245 0.430
Annual Family Income > $75K 0.299 0.458 0.527 0.500 0.325 0.469 0.669 0.471
2-digit Occupation
01 Public Administrators and 
Officials 0.000 0.016 0 0 0.001 0.025 0 0
02 Other Executive, 
Administrators, and Managers 0.099 0.299 0.165 0.371 0.120 0.324 0.252 0.435
03 Management Related 
Occupations 0.053 0.224 0.077 0.267 0.032 0.175 0.063 0.244
04 Engineers 0.004 0.065 0.003 0.057 0.035 0.184 0.046 0.210
05 Math. and Computer Scientists 0.013 0.111 0.038 0.192 0.025 0.156 0.051 0.221
06 Natural Scientists 0.003 0.058 0.010 0.100 0.005 0.069 0.006 0.077
07 Health Diagnosing Occupations 0.005 0.067 0.004 0.059 0.007 0.082 0.010 0.102
08 Health Assessment and Treating 0.049 0.216 0.026 0.160 0.007 0.083 0 0
09 College and University 
Teachers 0.007 0.082 0.045 0.208 0.007 0.085 0.057 0.232
10 Other Teachers 0.065 0.246 0.152 0.359 0.021 0.143 0.039 0.194
11 Lawyers and Judges 0.004 0.066 0.010 0.097 0.007 0.082 0.032 0.177
12 Other Professional Specialty 0.042 0.200 0.097 0.296 0.032 0.177 0.110 0.313
13 Health Technologists and 
Technicians 0.025 0.155 0.007 0.084 0.004 0.060 0 0
14 Engineering and Science 
Technicians 0.007 0.084 0.003 0.052 0.015 0.123 0.009 0.093
15 Other Technicians 0.010 0.100 0.014 0.116 0.015 0.121 0.027 0.162
16 Sales Supervisors and 
Proprietors 0.027 0.162 0.024 0.154 0.033 0.180 0.032 0.176
17 Sales Representatives, Finance 
and Business Service 0.018 0.132 0.055 0.229 0.018 0.131 0.089 0.285
18 Sales Representatives, 
Commodities except Retail 0.006 0.075 0.017 0.129 0.018 0.131 0.073 0.261
19 Sales Workers, Retail and 
Personal Services 0.067 0.249 0.026 0.159 0.036 0.186 0.020 0.139
20 Sales Related Occupations 0.001 0.030 0 0 0.000 0.021 0 0
21Supervisors, Administrative 
Support 0.010 0.099 0.001 0.038 0.004 0.064 0.003 0.055
22 Computer Equipment Operators 0.004 0.060 0.001 0.036 0.003 0.054 0 0
23 Secretaries, Stenographers, and 0.042 0.201 0.040 0.197 0.001 0.031 0.003 0.055
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Typists
24 Financial Records Processing 0.028 0.164 0.030 0.170 0.003 0.056 0.003 0.057
25 Mail and Message Distributing 0.005 0.073 0 0 0.010 0.099 0.002 0.044
26 Other Administrative Support 
Occupations, including Clerical 0.153 0.360 0.078 0.269 0.046 0.209 0.009 0.094
27 Private Household Service 0.001 0.025 0.004 0.061 0 0 0 0
28 Protective Service Occupations 0.009 0.093 0.002 0.044 0.031 0.172 0.004 0.066
29 Food Service Occupations 0.058 0.234 0 0 0.044 0.206 0 0
30 Health Service Occupations 0.036 0.186 0.007 0.086 0.004 0.064 0.003 0.056
31 Cleaning and Building Service 0.022 0.145 0 0 0.025 0.156 0 0
32 Personal Service 0.041 0.199 0.046 0.210 0.009 0.093 0.002 0.041
33 Mechanics and Repairs 0.004 0.061 0.003 0.052 0.061 0.240 0.024 0.153
34 Construction Trades 0.002 0.048 0 0 0.071 0.257 0.007 0.082
35Other Precision Production 0.012 0.111 0.004 0.066 0.040 0.195 0.003 0.050
36 Machine Operators and Tenders 0.024 0.153 0.001 0.023 0.039 0.194 0.004 0.065
37 Fabricators, Assemblers, 
Inspectors, and Samplers 0.016 0.124 0.007 0.083 0.025 0.155 0.001 0.036
38 Motor Vehicle Operators 0.008 0.089 0 0 0.052 0.222 0 0
39 Other Transportation and 
Material Moving 0.001 0.027 0 0 0.018 0.131 0 0
40 Construction Laborer 0.000 0.015 0 0 0.013 0.114 0.005 0.069
41 Freight, Stock and Material 
Handlers 0.012 0.107 0.003 0.057 0.034 0.182 0 0
42 Other Handlers, Equipment 
Cleaners, and Laborers 0.005 0.067 0 0 0.011 0.102 0.001 0.036
43 Farm Operators and Managers 0.000 0.018 0 0 0.000 0.021 0.004 0.060
44 Farm Related Workers 0.006 0.079 0 0 0.021 0.142 0.003 0.056
45 Forestry and Fishing 
Occupations 0.000 0.008 0 0 0.001 0.022 0.003 0.051
MSA w/ Population 100k – 250k 0.089 0.284 0.062 0.241 0.084 0.278 0.076 0.266
MSA w/ Population 250k – 500k 0.140 0.347 0.115 0.319 0.134 0.341 0.094 0.291
MSA w/ Population 500k – 1m 0.166 0.372 0.139 0.346 0.156 0.363 0.111 0.314
MSA w/ Population 1m – 2.5m 0.306 0.461 0.339 0.474 0.316 0.465 0.390 0.488
MSA w/ Population 2.5m – 5m 0.168 0.374 0.195 0.397 0.176 0.380 0.191 0.393
MSA w/ Population 5m+ 0.131 0.338 0.150 0.357 0.134 0.341 0.138 0.346
Note: Sample is constructed from the May 2001 CPS including workers who live in an MSA and are not self-employed 
on the main job. Observations with missing values for any of the listed variables are also dropped. Means and standard 
deviations are calculated using the weights from the CPS.
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Table 2-4. First-Stage Estimates of Telecommuting Models, May 2001 CPS
Married Women Single Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0.004** 0.004** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.014 0.013 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Black 0.023* 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
High Scholl Degree -0.013 -0.014 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Some College -0.008 -0.010 0.001 0.001 -0 -0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
College Degree 0.034** 0.033** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Graduate Degree 0.023 0.021 0.009 0.010 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)
Spouse 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
With Child 0-5 in HH. 0.022*** 0.021** 0.013* 0.013* 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
With Child 6-15 in HH. 0.010 0.009 0.014* 0.014* 0.013*** 0.012***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Household Size -0 0 -0.004* -0.004* -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
HH Income $40 – 75K -0.001 -0 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
HH Income > 75K 0.007 0.007 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
0.027 0.038 0.009 0.018 0.018 0.02703 Management Related 
Occupations (0.023) (0.037) (0.020) (0.032) (0.018) (0.024)
04 Engineers -0.032 -0.019 -0.049*** 0.009 -0.026** -0.059*
(0.038) (0.061) (0.014) (0.043) (0.013) (0.032)
05 Math. and Computer Scientists -0.025 -0.013 0.073** 0.112*** -0.027 -0.019
(0.035) (0.043) (0.033) (0.040) (0.021) (0.025)
0.025 0.083 0.010 0.045 -0.015 -0.01608 Health Assessment and 
Treating (0.032) (0.069) (0.029) (0.045) (0.025) (0.053)
-0.169** -0.143 0.052 0.079 -0.026 0.04309 College and University 
Teachers (0.076) (0.117) (0.136) (0.122) (0.089) (0.097)
10 Other Teachers -0.026 0.089 0.050*** -0.019 -0.019 0.021
(0.019) (0.073) (0.016) (0.078) (0.018) (0.051)
11 Lawyers and Judges -0.150 -0.200 -0.078** 0.071 0.005 0.045
(0.097) (0.144) (0.033) (0.076) (0.072) (0.090)
12 Other Professional Specialty 0.041* 0.039 0.027 0.040 0.054*** 0.074**
(0.023) (0.038) (0.018) (0.028) (0.017) (0.030)
0.067* 0.142* 0.014 0.019 0.007 0.04513 Health Technologists and 
Technicians (0.039) (0.076) (0.027) (0.045) (0.026) (0.050)
0.047 0.096* 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.04314 Engineering and Science 
Technicians (0.034) (0.050) (0.027) (0.041) (0.022) (0.035)
15 Other Technicians 0.051 0.069* -0.010 0.031 0.025 0.017
(0.037) (0.042) (0.026) (0.036) (0.026) (0.029)
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0.050* 0.156** 0.028 0.003 0.011 -0.01716 Sales Supervisors and 
Proprietors (0.026) (0.069) (0.021) (0.046) (0.019) (0.034)
0.024 -0.015 0.041 0.017 0.090*** 0.148**17 Sales Representatives, Finance 
and Business Service (0.033) (0.059) (0.028) (0.056) (0.032) (0.065)
-0.050 0.048 0.133* 0.118 0.051* -0.01018 Sales Representatives, 
Commodities except Retail (0.054) (0.069) (0.070) (0.075) (0.028) (0.040)
0.082** 0.205** 0.021 -0.040 0.034 0.00319 Sales Workers, Retail and 
Personal Services (0.038) (0.094) (0.029) (0.056) (0.029) (0.047)
-0.013 0.016 0.022 0.032 -0.037* -0.01921Supervisors, Administrative 
Support (0.025) (0.045) (0.040) (0.049) (0.019) (0.028)
0.086** 0.134** 0.028 0.020 0.120 0.15023 Secretaries, Stenographers, and 
Typists (0.038) (0.066) (0.031) (0.044) (0.082) (0.093)
0.096** 0.140** 0.015 0.016 0.041 0.05524 Financial Records Processing
(0.038) (0.062) (0.028) (0.042) (0.043) (0.049)
0.042 -0.021 0.004 -0.011 0.015 0.06225 Mail and Message Distributing
(0.042) (0.130) (0.033) (0.077) (0.030) (0.055)
0.067** 0.072 0.018 -0.018 0.014 0.04326 Other Administrative Support 
Occupations, including Clerical (0.033) (0.059) (0.027) (0.041) (0.027) (0.040)
0.044 0.088 0.016 0.061 0.007 0.091**28 Protective Service Occupations
(0.035) (0.096) (0.036) (0.060) (0.023) (0.041)
0.063 0.189** 0.020 -0.031 0.029 0.01829 Food Service Occupations
(0.038) (0.087) (0.032) (0.056) (0.030) (0.048)
0.076* 0.165** 0.018 0.013 0.050 0.09130 Health Service Occupations
(0.039) (0.081) (0.030) (0.052) (0.042) (0.070)
0.057 0.160** 0.014 -0.002 0.021 0.07731 Cleaning and Building Service
(0.038) (0.070) (0.032) (0.053) (0.029) (0.051)
32 Personal Service 0.103** 0.151** 0.049 0.030 0.026 0.058
(0.041) (0.068) (0.030) (0.043) (0.029) (0.049)
33 Mechanics and Repairs 0.033 0.067 0.064 0.066 0.027 0.047
(0.035) (0.057) (0.066) (0.077) (0.026) (0.044)
34 Construction Trades 0.064 0.136* 0.002 -0.027 0.021 0.035
(0.039) (0.071) (0.030) (0.058) (0.028) (0.043)
35Other Precision Production 0.073* 0.163*** 0.023 -0.006 0.014 0.018
(0.040) (0.060) (0.028) (0.046) (0.027) (0.037)
0.071* 0.181** 0.011 -0.029 0.027 0.04136 Machine Operators and 
Tenders (0.039) (0.072) (0.032) (0.055) (0.030) (0.044)
0.067* 0.173** 0.042 0.009 0.019 0.03137 Fabricators, Assemblers, 
Inspectors, and Samplers (0.037) (0.068) (0.039) (0.056) (0.028) (0.041)
38 Motor Vehicle Operators 0.057 0.037 0.008 0.009 0.020 0.020
(0.039) (0.083) (0.032) (0.057) (0.029) (0.047)
-0.001 0.098 -0.014 -0.019 0.017 0.02139 Other Transportation and 
Material Moving (0.035) (0.074) (0.035) (0.059) (0.029) (0.045)
40 Construction Laborer 0.051 0.154* -0.035 -0.055 0.022 0.048
(0.040) (0.080) (0.033) (0.064) (0.029) (0.046)
0.087 0.140* 0.019 -0.006 0.026 0.03341 Freight, Stock and Material 
Handlers (0.054) (0.082) (0.032) (0.055) (0.030) (0.046)
0.047 0.168** 0.008 -0.032 0.019 0.03442 Other Handlers, Equipment 
Cleaners, and Laborers (0.048) (0.075) (0.033) (0.057) (0.031) (0.048)
44 Farm Related Workers 0.079** 0.174** 0.010 -0.026 0.029 0.066
(0.038) (0.071) (0.032) (0.057) (0.030) (0.046)
Internet Penetration 0.539*** 0.481*** 0.143 0.183 0.288** 0.285**
(0.160) (0.163) (0.127) (0.134) (0.119) (0.115)
Constant -0.194*** -0.446** -0.081** 0.089 -0.072** -0.247**
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(0.053) (0.181) (0.039) (0.159) (0.032) (0.102)
Job-by-city Covariates N Y N Y N Y
Observations 6936 6936 6553 6553 13809 13809
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09
Note: All models include MSA fixed effects. Occupation-by-city covariates include fractions of employees within 
each 2-digit occupation and MSA who are male, white, black, have high school degree, some college, college degree, 
advanced degree, work in industries of transportation and communication, trade, finance, services, or public 
administration, and work in private profit or private non-profit sectors. Also included are occupation’s local labor 
market share, median log of wage, inter-quartile log of wage, and fraction of employees that have flexible work 
hours. Robust standard errors are estimated clustering on MSA. * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
and *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2-5. Reduced-Form Estimates of Commute Time Model, 2000 PUMS
Married Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.575*** 0.574***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Age Squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
White -1.532*** -1.498*** -0.018 -0.002
(0.344) (0.337) (0.222) (0.208)
Black 2.322*** 2.329*** 2.048*** 2.034***
(0.374) (0.377) (0.314) (0.326)
High Scholl Degree -0.731*** -0.640*** 0.194*** 0.229***
(0.151) (0.133) (0.071) (0.069)
Some College 0.126 0.181 0.276*** 0.286***
(0.153) (0.134) (0.098) (0.098)
College Degree 0.935*** 0.943*** 0.762*** 0.711***
(0.181) (0.187) (0.231) (0.226)
Graduate Degree 1.628*** 1.603*** -0.182 -0.324
(0.290) (0.261) (0.267) (0.247)
Spouse 1.193*** 1.191***
(0.107) (0.107)
With Child 0-5 in HH. 1.370*** 1.354*** 0.667*** 0.649***
(0.099) (0.098) (0.088) (0.085)
With Child 6–15 in HH. -0.535*** -0.533*** -0.091 -0.103
(0.106) (0.104) (0.092) (0.089)
Household Size -0.455*** -0.452*** 0.301*** 0.313***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.036)
HH Income $40 – 75K 0.320*** 0.337*** 0.330*** 0.341***
(0.097) (0.095) (0.079) (0.075)
HH Income > 75K 1.278*** 1.256*** 1.118*** 1.099***
(0.151) (0.148) (0.146) (0.142)
1.908*** 2.335*** 1.741*** 1.546***03 Management Related 
Occupations (0.247) (0.506) (0.239) (0.525)
04 Engineers 1.074*** 3.083*** 1.155*** 2.090***
(0.411) (1.185) (0.273) (0.795)
05 Math. and Computer Scientists 3.007*** 4.387*** 2.604*** 3.340***
(0.333) (0.569) (0.333) (0.650)
08 Health Assessment and Treating -0.434 -0.379 -1.485** -0.359
(0.662) (1.024) (0.603) (1.228)
-1.924** 3.412* -2.793*** 0.20109 College and University
Teachers (0.862) (1.956) (0.922) (2.106)
10 Other Teachers -7.506*** -3.951*** -5.218*** -0.868
(0.369) (1.271) (0.362) (1.900)
11 Lawyers and Judges -0.911 0.464 -0.947 -3.326
(0.967) (2.855) (0.660) (2.456)
12 Other Professional Specialty -1.984*** 1.559** -2.100*** 0.711
(0.204) (0.637) (0.175) (1.009)
-0.090 2.122** -0.468 1.70513 Health Technologists and 
Technicians (0.640) (1.068) (0.600) (1.605)
14 Engineering and Science 
Technicians
2.347*** 6.782*** 0.791* 3.843***
(0.595) (1.043) (0.438) (1.216)
15 Other Technicians 3.615*** 3.371*** 2.792*** 2.707***
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(0.373) (0.668) (0.446) (0.741)
-1.611*** 3.980*** -1.555*** 2.511**16 Sales Supervisors and 
Proprietors (0.368) (1.082) (0.364) (1.080)
-1.752*** -3.124** -0.679** -4.056**17 Sales Representatives, Finance 
and Business Service (0.273) (1.558) (0.336) (1.799)
2.259*** 8.260*** 2.597*** 7.295***18 Sales Representatives, 
Commodities except Retail (0.408) (1.080) (0.287) (1.002)
-3.976*** 2.761* -3.205*** 2.712*19 Sales Workers, Retail and 
Personal Services (0.630) (1.419) (0.615) (1.438)
0.143 3.418*** -0.112 2.892***21Supervisors, Administrative 
Support (0.411) (0.755) (0.447) (0.864)
-0.096 3.904*** -0.016 3.984***23 Secretaries, Stenographers, and 
Typists (0.542) (0.996) (0.585) (1.324)
24 Financial Records Processing 0.176 4.643*** 0.730 4.785***
(0.586) (1.047) (0.580) (1.025)
25 Mail and Message Distributing -0.399 3.378* -3.019*** 5.746***
(0.800) (1.911) (0.683) (1.757)
-0.095 1.157 -1.027* 0.52526 Other Administrative Support 
Occupations, including Clerical (0.568) (1.025) (0.533) (0.847)
28 Protective Service Occupations 0.034 4.622** -1.556** 2.642
(0.861) (1.885) (0.668) (1.744)
29 Food Service Occupations -4.354*** 2.308 -3.580*** 1.958
(0.713) (1.562) (0.653) (1.517)
30 Health Service Occupations -0.555 3.314*** -1.573** 1.725
(0.666) (1.216) (0.694) (1.730)
31 Cleaning and Building Service 0.610 5.096*** -2.378*** 0.985
(0.623) (1.424) (0.660) (1.754)
32 Personal Service -1.586*** 3.159** -1.509** 3.387**
(0.582) (1.218) (0.598) (1.598)
33 Mechanics and Repairs 2.594*** 6.459*** 0.015 2.849**
(0.601) (1.132) (0.583) (1.401)
34 Construction Trades 4.153*** 10.447*** 5.044*** 9.022***
(0.830) (1.477) (0.650) (1.545)
35Other Precision Production -0.472 5.480*** -0.701 3.599***
(0.595) (1.187) (0.602) (1.345)
36 Machine Operators and Tenders 0.151 6.061*** -1.077* 3.070**
(0.649) (1.417) (0.637) (1.553)
0.558 6.950*** 0.233 4.696***37 Fabricators, Assemblers, 
Inspectors, and Samplers (0.678) (1.302) (0.637) (1.495)
38 Motor Vehicle Operators -2.504*** 1.576 -1.549** 3.569**
(0.789) (1.422) (0.714) (1.548)
1.275 7.537*** 1.806*** 6.669***39 Other Transportation and 
Material Moving (1.075) (1.653) (0.665) (1.596)
40 Construction Laborer 5.827** 13.929*** 5.626*** 10.816***
(2.508) (2.834) (0.695) (1.737)
-0.629 5.467*** -1.286** 4.183***41 Freight, Stock and Material 
Handlers (0.632) (1.462) (0.650) (1.557)
-0.339 6.301*** -0.761 3.934**42 Other Handlers, Equipment 
Cleaners, and Laborers (0.827) (1.652) (0.643) (1.765)
44 Farm Related Workers 0.732 6.945*** -1.091 3.227*
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(0.968) (1.714) (0.739) (1.679)
Internet Penetration 5.988** 4.625** 1.364 1.599
(2.704) (2.311) (2.660) (2.188)
Constant 24.001*** 5.690 12.845*** -3.926
(1.012) (3.475) (0.735) (3.755)
Job-by-city Covariates N Y N Y
Observations 832956 832956 1720931 1720931
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Note: All models include MSA fixed effects. Robust standard errors are estimated clustering on 
MSA. * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2-6. TSIV Estimates of the Effects of Telecommuting on Commute Time and 
Mode
Table 2-6a. Commute Time
Married Women Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First-Stage
Coefficient 0.539*** 0.481*** 0.288** 0.285**
Standard Error 0.16 0.163 0.119 0.115
# of Observations 6936 6936 13809 13809
Reduced-Form
Coefficient 5.988** 4.625** 1.364 1.599
Standard Error 2.704 2.311 2.66 2.188
# of Observations 832956 832956 1720931 1720931
TSIV
Coefficient 11.109* 9.615* 4.736 5.610
Standard Error 6.004 5.805 9.441 8.004
Job-by-city  Covariates N Y N Y
Table 2-6b. Commute Mode
Married Women Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First-Stage
Coefficient 0.539*** 0.481*** 0.288** 0.285**
Standard Error 0.16 0.163 0.119 0.115
# of Observations 6936 6936 13809 13809
Reduced-Form
Coefficient 0.013 0.003 0.006 -0.043
Standard Error 0.047 0.036 0.05 0.037
# of Observations 849904 849904 174329 1743292
TSIV
Coefficient 0.024 0.006 0.021 -0.151
Standard Error 0.087 0.075 0.174 0.143
Job-by-city  Covariates N Y N Y
Note: All models include age, age squared, race, education, household 
composition, annual household income, and occupation and MSA fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are estimated clustering on MSA.* indicates significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2-7. Robustness Check of the TSIV Estimates
Table 2-7a. Commute Time
Married Women Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OCCUPATION – MSA SIZE CELL >= 30
First-Stage
Coefficient 0.419** 0.346** 0.302*** 0.325***
Standard Error 0.169 0.174 0.115 0.115
# of Observations 7157 7157 14724 14724
Reduced-Form
Coefficient 5.427*** 4.519*** 1.285 0.909
Standard Error 2.086 1.713 2.212 1.839
# of Observations 864097 864097 1831544 1831544
TSIV
Coefficient 12.952* 13.061 4.255 2.797
Standard Error 7.216 8.225 7.502 5.744
B. OFFICE WORKERS
First-Stage
Coefficient 0.574*** 0.532*** 0.254 0.244
Standard Error 0.169 0.171 0.175 0.164
# of Observations 5477 5477 6974 6974
Reduced-Form
Coefficient 5.369* 4.583* 1.858 0.966
Standard Error 3.051 2.355 2.054 2.137
# of Observations 654502 654502 845161 845161
TSIV
Coefficient 9.354 8.615* 7.315 3.959
Standard Error 5.986 5.221 9.529 9.154
C. TOPCODED COMMUTE TIME REPLACED BY 165 MIN
First-Stage
Coefficient 0.539*** 0.481*** 0.288** 0.285**
Standard Error 0.16 0.163 0.119 0.115
# of Observations 6936 6936 13809 13809
Reduced-Form
Coefficient 6.088** 4.517* 1.63 1.806
Standard Error 2.792 2.473 2.856 2.5
# of Observations 832956 832956 1720931 1720931
TSIV
Coefficient 11.295* 9.391 5.660 6.337
Standard Error 6.170 6.047 10.189 9.137
Job-by-city  Covariates N Y N Y
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Table 2-7b. Commute Mode
Married Women Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OCCUPATION – MSA SIZE CELL >= 30
First-Stage
Coefficient 0.419** 0.346** 0.302*** 0.325***
Standard Error 0.169 0.174 0.115 0.115
# of Observations 7157 7157 14724 14724
Reduced-Form
Coefficient 0.032 0.022 0.035 0.023
Standard Error 0.043 0.033 0.047 0.036
# of Observations 881551 881551 1855151 1855151
TSIV
Coefficient 0.076 0.064 0.116 0.071
Standard Error 0.107 0.101 0.162 0.114
B. OFFICE WORKERS
First-Stage
Coefficient 0.574*** 0.532*** 0.254 0.244
Standard Error 0.169 0.171 0.175 0.164
# of Observations 5477 5477 6974 6974
Reduced-Form
Coefficient 0.045 0.035 -0.059 -0.054
Standard Error 0.059 0.04 0.040 0.049
# of Observations 667751 667751 862045 862045
TSIV
Coefficient 0.078 0.066 -0.232 -0.221
Standard Error 0.105 0.078 0.225 0.250
Job-by-city  Covariates N Y N Y
Note: All models include age, age squared, race, education, household composition, 
annual household income, and occupation and MSA fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are estimated clustering on MSA.* indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5%, and *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2-8. Projection of Commute Time (Minute) onto Commute Distance (Mile)
All Women Men
(1) (2) (3)
Commute Distance 1.253 1.363 1.224
(0.018) (0.042) (0.023)
Distance Squared -0.002 -0.004 -0.0019
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003)
Constant 7.279 6.742 7.375
(0.143) (0.229) (0.203)
# Observations 44,218 21,404 22,814
Adj. R-squared 0.739 0.684 0.765
Note: The sample includes only those who drive to work in the 
sample in Table 2-1.
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3 Do People Drive Less on Code Red Days?
3.1 Introduction
By 2007, 347 counties with 141 million residents were designated by EPA as 
ground-level ozone nonattainment areas.16 This means that nearly half of the US 
population breathes air with ozone concentration above a harmful level. Besides the 
established fact that ozone has adverse effects on the respiratory system, recent studies 
(e.g., Bell et al. 2004) also link ozone levels with increases in mortality. Therefore, 
bringing the ozone levels into compliance with the EPA standard is a goal of high priority 
for public policy. 
Ozone is formed when its precursors, oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs), react in the atmosphere. Peak ozone levels typically occur on hot, 
dry and sunny summer days. Emissions from motor vehicle exhaust, industrial facilities 
and electric utilities are the main sources of NOx and VOCs. Dramatic increases in the 
number of cars and miles they are driven contribute significantly to the ozone problem in 
urban areas, in spite of the fact that individual vehicles are getting cleaner. According to 
the EPA (2003), motor vehicles account for 56% and 45% of emissions of NOx and VOC 
nationwide, respectively. 
A number of metropolitan areas have implemented public information programs that 
aim at mitigating the ozone problem by encouraging voluntary driving reductions on high 
ozone days. Examples include the Air Quality Action Days (AQAD) program in the 
                                                
16 See http://www.epa.gov/air/oaqps/greenbk/o8index.html
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Washington-Baltimore metropolitan area, the Spare the Air (STA) program in the San 
Francisco Bay area, and the Ozone Action Days program in Atlanta, to name a few. 
Undoubtedly, these programs have low implementation and enforcement costs, in 
contrast to mandatory control programs. They also take advantage of the episodic feature 
of the ozone problem, a strategy that theoretically promotes economic efficiency (Teller 
1967, Krupnick 1988). However, the first question that needs to be addressed is how 
effective these programs are in getting cars off the road. People receiving forecast 
information may cancel trips due to the concerns about getting unhealthy exposure and/or 
the environmental impacts of driving on those days. Nevertheless, for many people,
including most commuters, it is very costly to change travel schedules, if not impossible. 
The question is whether the information provided creates enough incentives for the 
recipients to take action. 
Identifying the impact of the programs on vehicle driving also serves a practical 
purpose in air quality regulation. These public information programs all fall into the 
category of Voluntary Mobile Source Emission Reduction Programs (VMEPs). Since 
1997, the U.S. EPA allows states with non-attainment areas to claim credits up to 3% of 
projected emissions reductions for VMEPs when filing State Implementation Plans 
(SIPs). To do so requires that mobile emission reductions through voluntary programs be 
quantified. 
 Several studies have looked at how these voluntary information programs impact 
travel behavior. Henry and Gordon (2003), MWCOG (2003), and Fox and Sarkar (2002) 
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use individual survey data to examine to what extent the ozone alerts have altered 
behavior. They all find that a significant share of respondents reported taking actions 
during ozone episodes to help abate pollution. For example, Fox and Sarkar report that in 
the Washington-Baltimore area, 7-9 percent of respondents said they drove less on code 
red days, days when the ozone levels are predicted to exceed the EPA standard. A 
common issue, however, with the self-reported information is that it may be biased due to 
recollection difficulty or other subjective factors. Instead, Cummings and Walker (2000), 
Cutter and Neidell (2007) and Welch et al. (2005) directly examine traffic volumes in 
Atlanta and the San Francisco Bay area and train ridership in Chicago, respectively. 
Cummings and Walker and Welch et al. found either the traffic reductions were too small 
to be surely attributed to the program or the ozone advisories increased transit ridership 
only in a small part of the Chicago area. To the contrary, Cutter and Neidell found that 
STAs reduce total daily traffic by 2.5 to 3.5 percent, with most effects occurring during 
and just after the morning peak hours.
The focus of this study is to examine the effectiveness of the AQAD program in the 
Baltimore area, an area relying more on automobile driving than the Chicago, San 
Francisco and Washington DC metropolitan areas.17 The program forecasts daily ozone 
level one day ahead and uses color codes to indicate expected ozone severity. When the 
                                                
17 Besides a bus system, Baltimore’s transit system consists of a single-line metro subway and a three-line 
light rail, most parts of which overlap. In terms of commuting, the percentage of drivers is higher and the 
percentage of rail riders is lower than the national average, based on data from NHTS 2001. See Table A2 
for a comparison of the distributions of commuters by commute mode across several cities.
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ozone level is predicted to reach or exceed the one-hour ozone standard, 125 ppb, a code 
red is announced. I use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to see whether traffic 
volumes are lower on code red days due to the announcement. The study is closest to 
Cutter and Neidell in methodology, and obtains somewhat similar results. The main 
finding is that the code red day announcement reduces inbound traffic volumes during 
morning peak hours by 3-5%. Outbound traffic volumes in the evening peak hours fall 
correspondingly. In contrast, on code orange days, when ozone levels are predicted to 
exceed 105 ppb but lie below 125 ppb, I do not observe a reduction in vehicle driving.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 documents the details of 
the AQAD program. Section 3.3 presents a theoretical account of potential behavioral 
changes in response to code red days. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 describe the empirical 
methods and data used, respectively. Section 3.6 presents the results, and section 3.7 
discusses the policy implications of my findings.
3.2 AQAD Program in Baltimore Area
The Baltimore area, with over 2.5 million residents in 2000, consists of five 
counties18 and Baltimore city. It is designated as a nonattainment area by EPA under both 
the 1-hour and 8-hour ozone standards. Since the mid-1990s the area has been 
implementing the AQAD program jointly with the Washington metropolitan area. Under 
the coordination of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG), a 
                                                
18 They are Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Carroll, Harford and Howard. See 
http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/baltimo.html for a regional map. The designated area is different 
from the census MSA definition.
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daily forecast of the ozone level19 is conducted for each area by a panel of meteorologists 
every day from May 1st to mid-September.
The ozone level is predicted as a quadratic function of a vector of variables including 
maximum and average surface temperatures, wind speed, relative humidity, solar zenith 
angel, and lagged ozone observations. Note that the predicting variables measure only the 
most relevant air and climatological conditions. Because they do not include variables 
that forecast vehicle travel demand and electric utility production, the model does not 
account for human behavior. The parameters of the function are estimated using 
historical observations and remain unchanged for the current year. The model produces 
forecasts for each of seven locations in Baltimore area where ozone monitoring stations
are located. The highest one is chosen as the initial forecast for the area.
The expert panel meets on a conference call at 3:00 pm every afternoon to discuss 
and make adjustments to the initial forecast. This stage is subjective to the extent that it 
relies on the experience of the participants. A personal communication with one of the 
panel members indicates that the rational for this subjective procedure is multi-fold. First, 
some factors are hard to quantify or are insignificant in model estimation, e.g., the 
direction of wind from outside the area, but need to be taken into account. The day of the 
week is sometimes taken into account to address concerns about traffic. The panel also 
needs to consider different versions of weather forecasts as well as to adjust ozone
forecasts at the lower and upper ends because the model seems to perform better in the 
                                                
19 The one-hour ozone level was forecast until 2003. Since 2004, eight-hour levels have been forecast..
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middle range of ozone levels than at the extremes. Although the changes often involve 
only a couple of units, they may result in a shift of the air quality category in which the 
day falls.
A color code is assigned to the day based on the consensus forecast value. Table 3-1
shows the ranges of forecast one-hour ozone concentrations and the corresponding code 
colors. When the ozone level is predicted to exceed the EPA standard, i.e. 125 ppb, a red 
code is designated and the day is called a code red day. The last column in Table 3-1
shows the distribution of summer days across air quality categories. 28 days were 
announced as code red days in 2001 through 2003, accounting for 6.8 percent of the 
season. Code orange days indicate that the ozone concentration will reach a level 
unhealthy for sensitive populations. These days account for 10.6 percent of the period.
The forecast as well as the code color are publicized through various communication 
channels once they are available. People who subscribe to a mailing list receive email 
notification. Local employers who enroll in the clean air partner program receive an 
email or fax. Major newspapers and TV and radio stations will report air quality forecasts
together with weather forecasts. News sources will highlight code red days to enhance 
visibility for the program. People are urged to take actions to reduce ozone precursors 
emissions on high ozone days. On the top of the action list is reducing driving by all 
means, including carpooling, teleworking, riding transit, and consolidating trips.
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3.3 Theory
A simple discrete choice model can be used to analyze individual's choice between 
driving and its substitutes on code red days. Specifically, we consider staying/working at 
home and using public transit as the alternatives an individual may choose. Other travel 
options such as carpool and bicycle may be incorporated into the framework easily and 
would not affect the main results obtained below.
Suppose an individual chooses to drive ( d ), to ride public transit ( p ) or stay/work at 
home ( h ) in order to maximize her utility 
ij ij ijU V  
where i  indexes individual, { , , }j d p h . The utility is the sum of a deterministic part V
and an idiosyncratic part  . Further assume that the deterministic utility is a weighted 
linear combination of travel benefits and a variety of travel costs. That is
0 1 2 3ij ij ij ij ijV B TC HC EC      
where B  stands for trip benefit ( 0hB  ), TC  is travel cost, including gas, bus fare, and 
time, HC  is health cost resulting from exposure to bad air quality, and EC  is the 
environment cost associated with one's choice. The model assumes that everybody has 
common weights,  's, and 0 0  , 1 2 3, , 0     although the benefits/costs of each 
choice vary by individuals. In one case, people may differ in the extent that they 
internalize the negative impact on air quality for the same amount of driving, but they 
value air quality equally. Also, people with existing respiratory problem may have greater 
health costs than those without when exposed to the same air pollution.
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We assume that ij  are independently distributed as type-I extreme value. Let iy
denote the choice of individual i  that maximize the utility, i.e. arg max( , , )i id ip ihy U U U . 
The probability of choosing j  is
3 3
0 0
Pr( | ) exp / expi i k ijk k ijk
k j k
y j x x x 
 
    
      
    
  
where 0x B  , 1x TC  , 2x HC  , and 3x EC  . For all individuals,
( ) / ( )[1 ( )]j jk j j kp x x p x p x                                            (3-1)
and
( ) / ( ) ( )j lk j l kp x x p x p x     , l k .                                   (3-2)
We are interested in how probabilities of choosing different alternatives change when 
it is a code red day. Equations (3-1) and (3-2) tell us that the probability change for any 
alternative depends on the changes in each benefit/cost factors for the option itself and all 
others on code red days. To derive further results from the model, we assert the following 
changes and relationships
(i) 0d p hB B B      ,
(ii) 0d h pTC TC TC      ,
(iii) 0 h d pHC HC HC      ,
(iv) , 0p h dEC EC EC     .
Relationship (i) states that the benefit from making the trip does not change on 
code red days for any option; (ii) reflects the assumption that people may expect other 
people to forego driving for riding public transit. Thus, traffic is expected to be lighter 
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while transit becomes more crowded and uncomfortable; (iii) indicates that when air 
quality gets worse, people walking to and waiting at the bus stop are more exposed to 
ozone. Driving in a car may or may not increase risk while staying indoors is always safe; 
and (iv) implies that people are altruistic and may gain satisfaction (negative cost) for not 
driving on code red days or may feel guilty for driving. These relationships are sensible 
and not all are necessary for reaching the theoretical conclusion below. 
Taking into account the cost changes on code red days, the change in the 
probability of driving (also taking transit and staying home) for an individual is 
ambiguous. This is mainly because declining air quality lowers the travel cost and health 
cost of driving relative to riding bus, although there may be some utility gain from 
reducing emissions. Even if people do not speculate about the improved traffic on code 
red days, or in some areas bus fares are waived for riders on high ozone days, which 
results in lower travel cost for riding bus, bus ridership may still not go up due to health 
concern about the air quality.
The above analysis shows that the voluntary information program does not 
provide people incentives necessarily consistent with reducing driving on code red days. 
It is important to empirically measure the impact of the program on driving amount. 
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The primary question this study attempts to answer is whether the AQAD program 
changes individuals' travel behavior episodically. Do people reduce vehicle trips and/or 
miles traveled on code red days? Ideally, we would like to have a random sample of 
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households in the Baltimore area, together with their daily VMTs for all summer days. 
However, such micro-data do not exist. What is available, instead, is data measuring
traffic volumes during short time intervals on highways in the Baltimore area. (These will 
be described in detail in the next section). With these data, we can estimate the following 
model to measure changes in traffic on code red days that can be attributed to the AQAD 
program.
it t t i ity CRD X B                                                  (3-3)
where ity  is (log) number of vehicles passing by traffic monitor i
20 on date t . tCRD is 
an indicator for day t to be a code red day and the parameter   measures the impact of 
code red day announcement on highway traffic volumes. The vector tX contains other 
time varying factors that may affect vehicle trips, such as contemporaneous and lagged 
weather, the forecast 1-hour ozone concentration and observed ozone levels for the
previous day, contemporaneous and lagged gas prices, public holiday dummies and a set 
of dummies for year, month, and day of the week. In a specification check, I include 
lagged traffic of the same time block on previous days and seven days ago. i  represents 
a monitor fixed effect to capture the time-invariant traffic characteristics for each 
monitor. The variable it  is an unobserved idiosyncratic term.  
The problem in consistently estimating   is that code red days are not random. Even 
conditional on all those covariates, there still could be some variables missing in the 
                                                
20 Please note this is different from the ozone monitoring stations mentioned earlier. Coincidentally, the 
number of traffic monitors in the sample is also seven.
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model that are correlated with the code red day announcement and traffic flow. For 
instance, forecast weather plays a crucial role in predicting ozone concentration and 
determining code color. It is also arguably important in affecting people's travel decision 
for the coming day. However, historical forecast weather data is not readily accessible. 
Although we control for the observed weather and its lag, they may fail to account 
adequately for the forecast weather. If it is the case, a naïve regression estimation would 
yield a spurious estimate of  .
However, if we could control for the conditional expectation of the unobservables in 
the model, we would still be able to estimate   consistently. That is to estimate the 
following model instead of equation (3-3),
 |it t it t t i ity CRD E CRD X B                                              (3-4)
where  |it tE CRD  is expectation of it  conditional on the code red day indicator, and 
( | , , )it it it t t iy E y CRD X   . If tCRD  is the only variable correlated with it , OLS 
estimation of equation (3-4) yields a consistent   estimate. In practice,  |it tE CRD  is 
not observed. However, we know that the code red day announcement is completely 
dependent on the forecast ozone concentration, denoted by O . When and only when the 
forecast level exceeds a threshold, will it be a code red day. Formally, 
*( ) 1{ }t t tCRD f O O O  
where *O  denotes the threshold equal to 125 ppb . Thus, we could exploit the sharp 
regression discontinuity design (e.g. van der Klaauw 2002) to measure the impact of code 
red days. Since O , referred to as a running variable in the literature, captures all the 
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information contained in CRD ,  | ( | )it t it tE CRD E O  . Thus, we could estimate 
equation (3-5)
( )it t t t i ity CRD k O X B                                               (3-5)
where ( )k O  is a flexible functional specification for ( | )E O . In the literature, ( )k O
often takes the form of high-order polynomial series. 
As noted above, the vector X  contains a linear term in the forecast ozone level. It 
is, however, possible that the linear term is insufficient to completely account for the 
correlation between CRD  and  . Figure 3-1 illustrates that the estimates (  ) obtained
by controlling only for the linear term in the forecast ozone level will underestimate (left 
panel) or overestimate (right panel) the true effect when the correlation between CRD
and   is a nonlinear function of O . In the estimation, I include up to a fifth order 
polynomial in the ozone forecast. 
Two key assumptions must be satisfied in order to apply the regression discontinuity 
method (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). First, it is assumed that there is no manipulation of 
the running variable. In our case, if the expert panel adjusts the forecast ozone level to 
move a day into or out of the code red category based on expected transportation 
volumes, concern about the validity of RD strategy might be raised. A communication 
from one of the panel members stated that no sophisticated traffic information (e.g.,
forecasted daily traffic volumes) beyond the day of the week was considered in 
forecasting ozone concentration. More specifically, it happened occasionally that the 
forecast level was adjusted upward for Monday or downward for Friday based on the 
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general impression about traffic patterns on these days. However, this is the only channel 
through which traffic is taken into account in code red day classification. In the next 
section, it is shown that Mondays and Fridays are not statistically more likely to be (or 
not be) a code red day. In addition, all models are estimated controlling for day-of-week 
dummy. In the robustness check, I exclude Mondays and Fridays from the sample used 
for estimation. 
The other assumption underlying the RD model is that the unobserved variables that 
may affect traffic volumes evolve continuously at the cutoff point, i.e.125 ppb. This 
assumption cannot be verified directly. As a specification test presented in the next
section, I check the discontinuity of the control variables, especially weather covariates. 
If some variables are found discontinuous at 125 ppb, it casts doubt on the continuity 
assumption for the unobservables.
3.5 Data
The Maryland Department of Environment (MDE) has archived the forecast and 
observed daily maximum one-hour ozone concentrations for the Baltimore area. I use 
data from May through mid-September --- the ozone season when the AQAD program is 
in place --- from 2001 to 2003. I focus on these three years because traffic data is 
available from 2001 and the color code assignment started to be based on an 8-hour 
ozone forecast and the 8-hour standard in 2004.21 The code color is also available from 
                                                
21 The 8-hour standard is stricter in the sense that more days are designated as exceedance days. However, 
most exceedance days are code orange. It may be interesting to examine how the scheme change affects 
people's responses.  
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MDE. Alternatively, it can be determined by applying the rule described in Table 3-1. The 
latter matches the recorded one perfectly, which confirms the relationship between code 
color and forecast ozone. A sharp RD rather than fuzzy RD model is therefore appropriate.
In the early 2000s, the Maryland State High Administration (SHA) started to install 
detectors22 along major roads to monitor and record traffic conditions. The detectors 
count the number of vehicles and volume is reported in five-minute intervals. For the 
project, weekday traffic volumes of the years 2001 through 2003 were obtained from the 
University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Transportation Technology Laboratory 
(CATT Lab), which archives data from the Maryland SHA.
As the detector system was established shortly before the period we examine, the 
performance of detectors and the data transfer network was not ideal. This resulted in 
considerable missing data. I restrict the set of detectors to be analyzed to those with less 
than 30 percent of 5-minute intervals missing, which gives seven detectors located on
four major interstate highways in the Baltimore metropolitan area.23 Table 3-2 provides 
information about the detectors and the traffic they are monitoring. The routes where 
these detectors are located all carry heavy traffic from the surrounding areas into and out 
of the Baltimore urban area. These roads rank from 3rd to 8th in terms of 2003 annual 
average daily traffic (AADT) in the area. Unfortunately, we do not have data for I-95 and 
                                                
22 Different from those buried underneath the road surface, this type of detectors is usually mounted on 
existing side-of-the-road poles and work with microwave sensor technology. See http://www.rtms-by-
eis.com/rtms_features.html for more information.
23 See Figure 3-2 for a map showing major freeways of the region and locations of detectors.
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I-695, two major routes through and around the Baltimore area, respectively. Five 
detectors monitor inbound traffic while two monitor outbound traffic.
I aggregate the 5-minute volumes into four time blocks following the definitions in 
the Baltimore Metropolitan Council's travel demand model (BMC 2004). They are 
morning peak (6 AM – 10 AM), mid-day (10 AM – 3 PM), evening peak (3 PM – 7 PM), 
and other times (7 PM – 6 AM). This aggregation largely overcomes the short-term 
fluctuations in traffic flow caused by traffic conditions. More importantly, the time 
blocks group together hours with homogenous traffic patterns and separate those with 
different patterns. It is therefore more appropriate to study traffic pattern changes at the 
time block level than at 5-minute interval or hourly levels.
It is difficult to fill in missing observations on traffic volume. In general, filling in 
missing values of the dependent variable in a single-equation regression may lead to 
biased estimation (Greene 2003). So time blocks with one or more missing 5-minute 
interval are dropped from the regression. This may lead to an efficiency loss but should 
have no effect on estimator consistency so long as the time blocks that do not enter the 
volume regression are not systematically correlated with the explanatory variable of 
interest, i.e. CRD.  Table 3-3 presents checks on the correlation between dropped time 
blocks and code red days. Each column represents a probit model specification with 
incremental inclusion of control variables. When CRD is the only explanatory variable 
(column (1)), it seems to affect the missing pattern of all times of day except for the 
morning peak period. However, since CRD occurs on hot, sunny days it may pick up 
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weather impacts on the detector system. When the linear forecast ozone level and a full 
set of covariates including weather conditions are included (columns (2) and (3)) in the 
model, the effect of CRD becomes smaller and statistically insignificant. Adding 
polynomials terms in the forecast ozone level (column (4)) does not change the result at 
all. Thus, we conclude that estimating equation (3-5) with only the complete time blocks 
should not give us biased estimates due to missing observations.
Daily weather measures including temperature (maximum and minimum), wind 
speed, relative humidity (maximum and minimum) and precipitation were obtained from
the National Climatic Data Center and are observed at the weather station located in the 
Baltimore-Washington International Airport. Daily average prices for regular unleaded 
gasoline in Baltimore area are provided by the GasBuddy Organization. I use the first 
through seventh lags of gasoline price to control for the impact of gas price on travel 
demand.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3-4 presents the means and standard deviations of 
control variables for non-code-red days and code red days, respectively. Column (3) 
shows differences in means between the two types of days and the associated standard 
errors. Generally speaking, a code red day is more likely to occur on hot, dry days with 
lower wind speed. The observed ozone level for the day before the forecasted day is 
significantly higher for the code red day. However, neither the short-term historical retail 
gas price nor the day of week differ significantly, which is consistent with the fact that the 
ozone forecasting model is basically a meteorological model rather than a behavioral one. 
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Although adjustments may have been made accounting for the day of the week, it seems 
to be a rare unsystematic practice.
One key identification assumption mentioned earlier is that the conditional mean of 
the unobservable, i.e. ( | )E O , is continuous at *O =125 ppb. The evidence in support of
this assumption can be found by testing the continuity of the observed covariates. Figure
3-3 plots the average daily characteristics including temperature (max and min), 
precipitation, wind speed, humidity (max and min), retail gas price (lags), ozone 
observation (lag) and Monday and Friday dummies, against the forecast of ozone level. 
The predicted values from a fifth-order polynomial in the forecast level as well as the 95 
percent confidence intervals are also presented. The figures suggest that there is no large, 
statistically significant break for these variables when ozone levels change from non-
code-red days to code red days. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3-4 provide quantitative 
support for this finding. Although code red days are different from non-code-red days, as 
shown in column (3), when the comparison is narrowed between code red days and code 
orange days in column (4), the difference diminishes dramatically in magnitude across all 
variables and only the max temperature and observed ozone level remain statistically 
significant. The higher max temperature and observed ozone level the day before most 
likely reflect only the higher forecast ozone level for code red days. Column (5), 
equivalent to Figure 3-3, reports the estimated coefficient of CRD when a fifth-order 
polynomial in forecast ozone level is included in the regression. It indicates that the 
difference between code red days and non-code-red days is small and statistically 
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insignificant conditional on the forecast level. These results suggest that the unobserved 
characteristics are unlikely to be discontinuous at the CRD cutoff point. 
3.6 Results
Table 3-5 presents the estimates of the effects of CRD on traffic volumes by time of 
day. Each model is estimated for a pooled sample as well as two sub-samples separating
inbound detectors from outbound detectors. Although detector fixed effects account for
the unique features of traffic pattern for each location and direction, it may be true that
inbound and outbound traffic respond to CRD in distinct ways. Further, given symmetry 
between morning and evening travel, i.e. the morning inbound (outbound) traffic returns 
in the evening on the same routes, we should expect to see CRD have similar impacts on 
morning inbound (outbound) traffic and evening outbound (inbound) traffic. The sample 
is therefore split to explore the heterogeneity in the effects of CRD on inbound and 
outbound traffic. Common covariates across models include weather conditions and their 
lags, the observed ozone level for the previous day, lagged retail gas prices, and dummies 
for year, month, day of the week, public holidays and detectors.24 Overall, the models 
explain traffic patterns reasonably well, with an 2R  above 0.90 for the full sample and 
above 0.80 for inbound and outbound sub-samples.
Columns (1)-(3) report the results of the first specification, in which the model 
controls for the ozone forecast in linear form only. For the full sample, CRD decreases 
morning peak traffic by 1.7 percent but increases mid-day traffic by 3.3 percent. The 
                                                
24 Models including lagged traffic on previous days and seven days ago yield no different estimates.
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average weekday morning peak and mid-day traffic volumes across monitors are about 
8500 and 8000, respectively. Applying the estimates suggests that on average 145 or so 
vehicle trips from 6 AM to 10 AM were cancelled or moved to other time periods. For 
the mid-day hours 10 AM to 3 PM, trips rose by about 264, which could be a result of 
trip rescheduling from the morning and/or people switching to driving to avoid ozone 
exposure. However, it is not obvious why people would postpone their vehicle travel 
closer to noon. When we look at inbound and outbound traffic separately, the CRD has 
little effect on inbound traffic except for increasing mid-day volumes by 4 percent. It 
lowers outbound traffic by 2.6 percent in the morning and 3.3 percent in the evening. 
These results are not consistent with a symmetric traffic pattern between inbound and 
outbound routes. As we discussed before, these estimates could be biased if the control 
function of the forecast level is not flexible enough.
Columns (4)-(6) are the baseline regression discontinuity models using a fifth order 
polynomial in forecast ozone to proxy for ( | )E O . Column (4) shows that the CRD
reduces morning traffic by 5 percent for the pooled sample, which is equal to about 425 
vehicle trips on average. In contrast to column (2), the CRD does not exhibit a 
statistically significant impact on traffic during other periods of a day. When inbound and 
outbound traffic are examined separately (see columns (5) and (6)), the CRD is found to 
lower the morning peak inbound traffic by 5 percent. Moreover, this reduction is matched 
in the outbound traffic, which declines 2.6 percent in the evening peak and 5 percent in 
other hours on code red days. The coefficients of CRD are positive for the inbound 
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sample during mid-day and evening and negative for morning outbound, but neither is 
statistically significant. These results suggest that the code red day alert indeed reduces 
traffic, albeit by a small proportion.25
Columns (7)-(9) maintain the RD specification and exclude the code green days 
from the sample, to test whether the results are driven by observations far away from the 
cutoff point.26 The main finding remains unchanged: morning inbound traffic declines by 
5 percent and the evening outbound traffic declines correspondingly. The difference is
that outbound trip reductions are concentrated in the evening peak hours rather than in 
other hours. These estimates imply that the RD approach is appropriate for measuring the 
effect of the AQAD program, which a normal regression fails to capture.
Table 3-6 reports additional tests of the robustness of the results. The expert panel 
occasionally manipulates the ozone forecast and/or code color on Mondays and Fridays 
to account for traffic patterns, but not on other days of the week. The RD strategy is 
plausible if it yields similar estimates with a sample containing only Tuesday through 
Thursday. Columns (1)-(3) show that morning traffic is lower by 3 percent for the pooled 
sample and lower by 4 percent for the inbound sub-sample on code red days. Outbound 
traffic is reduced by 3 percent, though the effect is not statistically significant. Although
                                                
25 Table A3 provides full estimation results for models specified in columns (4) through (6) of Table 3-5. 
26 Table 3-1 shows that code green days account for 51 percent of sample days and code yellow days 
account for 31 percent. The estimates appear to be sensitive to individual observations when code yellow 
days are removed. It is more likely because of the dramatic decrease in sample size.
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the samples diminish in size by two fifths, we still find evidence consistent with the 
baseline results
Another test of the findings is to see whether similar reductions occur on other days, 
Code orange days mean an air quality alert to the public, although not to the same degree 
as on a code red day. Therefore, we expect no or a smaller decline in vehicle trips on 
code orange days. The hypothesis is tested in two specifications. I replace the CRD
dummy with a dummy for code orange and code red days in the first case, and use two 
dummies, one for code orange days and one for code red days, in the second case. 
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 3-6 report the first specification and columns (7)-(9) report the 
second. The dummy for code orange and red days does not have a negative impact on 
traffic volumes. Instead, it increases the morning inbound traffic slightly. When models 
include two separate dummies, the code red dummy has significant negative effects on 
morning inbound volumes while the code orange dummy has statistically insignificant
effects sometimes opposite to code red. Both results suggest that drivers do not respond 
to code orange as they do to code red days. 
Code red days often occur on consecutive days. The cost of foregoing driving may 
rise on the second or third code red day. For instance, it may be easier for a professional 
to work from home one day a week than two or three days a week. On the other hand, if 
the marginal cost of driving on code red days increases, an individual is more likely to 
take some action on the second or third code red day than on the first. I estimate the 
following models to see the effect of consecutive code red days. In addition to the code 
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red day dummy, I add to the model a dummy equal to one if it is the second, third or 
fourth (the longest string is four).code red day in a row, or a dummy for the third or 
fourth code red day. Columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) of Table 3-7 report the results for these 
two cases respectively. For the pooled sample, morning traffic is lower by 6 percent on 
the first code red day but only 4 percent lower for the second, third or fourth code red day. 
When the sample is split between inbound and outbound detectors, however, the effect 
loses statistical significance. A dummy for the third or fourth code red days in a row does 
not exhibit reinforcing or offsetting effects either. 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
The findings of this study are similar to those in Cutter and Neidell's (2007), which 
examines a similar program in the San Francisco Bay Area. Both results suggest that the 
voluntary information programs lead to a small reduction in vehicle trips and the effect 
most is concentrated in the morning peak period. The evidence that the reduction occurs 
for the morning inbound traffic and evening outbound traffic seems to provide additional 
support for the main results. 
The timing of the effect suggests that it is commuting trips that are reduced. The 
workers who usually drive to work could potentially work at home or switch to other 
travel modes such as taking public transportation, walking/biking and carpooling on code 
red days. The former is especially likely since, according to the 2001 National Household 
Travel Survey, 7.7 percent of workers work at home at least one day every month and 4.7 
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percent at least one day every week in the Washington-Baltimore metropolitan area. 
These people should generally have more flexibility to avoid driving on code red days.
Although the program is demonstrated to have some expected impact, the magnitude 
seems too small to reduce vehicle emissions dramatically. As the literature suggests
voluntary programs are unlikely to improve air quality sufficiently to bring a region into 
compliance status. An innovative approach would be a permit program that restricts 
driving on high ozone days unless a permit is bought for each vehicle. The program could 
be effective if the permit price is set high enough, which presents a strong disincentive 
for many people to drive. Imposing the control on an episodic basis means the program 
could be more economically efficient than programs with year-round controls.
One objective of the programs like AQAD is to see how education and persuasion 
might alter individuals' behavior in favor of the environment. This study indicates that 
these efforts are not made in vain. In addition to limiting driving, the program also asks 
people to refuel vehicles after dusk or on another day. It may be worth investigating 
whether this is an easier behavioral change for people to make once data are available.
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Figures and Tables for Chapter 3
Figure 3-1. Illustration of Biased Estimates with Linear Forecast Ozone Level
Note: The graphs show that the estimated CRD effect,   , controlling for linear forecast ozone level could 
underestimate (left) or overestimate (right) the true effect of CRD,  , when the underlying relationship 
between y  and forecast ozone level is nonlinear.
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Figure 3-2. Map of Baltimore Region Major Freeways and Maryland SHA’s Traffic 
Detectors
Source: Created with ArcMap using Census 2000 TIGER/Line® Shapefiles and Bureau of Trasportation 
Statistics’ Highway Performance Monitoring System data. Locations of detectors are not accurate but 
illustrative.
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Note: The dots represent the average daily characteristics for each forecast ozone level. The continuous line 
is the predicted values from a fifth-order polynomial in forecast level with the dashed lines for 95 percent 
confidence interval.
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Table 3-1. One-hour Ozone Level and Code Colors in Baltimore Area
1-hour Ozone 
(ppb)
Code Color Health Concern Number of Days 
2001-2003
0 – 79 Green Good 214
80 – 104 Yellow Moderate 128
105 – 124 Orange Unhealthy for sensitive groups 44
125 Red Unhealthy 28
Source: http://www.mwcog.org/environment/air/downloads/calendar_2003.pdf, MWCOG.
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Table 3-2. Description of Detectors and Traffic in Baltimore Area
Detector Highway AADT 2003 Direction In/Out Bound Missing %
1 I-83 86,293 (4th) S In 9.7
2 I-83 86,293 (4th) S In 26.3
3 I-83 86,293 (4th) N Out 18.5
4 I-795 81,500 (5th) S In 17.8
5 I-97 105,008 (3rd) N In 17.3
6 I-97 105,008 (3rd) S Out 9.4
7 I-70 44,142 (8th) E In 10.4
Note: The third column presents annual average daily traffic in 2003. The top two roads missing 
here are I-95 with AADT of 169,534 and I-695 with AADT of 167,473.
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Table 3-3. Correlation between Missing Time Block and Code Red Day
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Morning peak 0.272 0.325 0.219 0.453
(0.249) (0.221) (0.148) (0.350)
0.002 0.003 0.117 0.120
Mid-day 0.445 -0.068 -0.172 0.025
(0.160) (0.157) (0.167) (0.244)
0.006 0.021 0.154 0.155
Evening peak 0.665 -0.064 -0.043 0.137
(0.125) (0.138) (0.145) (0.206)
0.014 0.044 0.179 0.183
Other 0.349 0.300 0.142 0.218
(0.179) (0.174) (0.176) (0.237)
0.004 0.004 0.088 0.089
N 2898 2884 2849 2849
Linear forecast ozone level N Y Y Y
2nd to 5th order polynomials 
of the forecast ozone N N N Y
Control variables N N Y Y
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the time block is to be 
dropped from traffic volume equation. The first row of each time-of-day panel is 
probit estimates of the coefficient of CRD, the second row is standard error 
clustered on each week, and the third row is the pseudo-R squared. Control 
variables include weather variables and their lags, observed ozone levels, lags of 
daily gas price, and year, month, day-of-week, holiday, and monitor dummies,.
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Table 3-4. Summary Statistics and Difference in Selected Covariates Between Code Red 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Max temperature 80.903 94.462 13.558 2.873 1.051
8.771 3.313 (0.842) (0.875) (1.935)
Min temperature 60.824 69.538 8.714 2.480 1.630
8.959 4.282 (1.002) (1.347) (2.826)
Precipitation 14.896 1.000 -13.896 3.412 -4.202
39.252 2.966 (2.463) (2.533) (9.279)
Wind speed 62.654 52.654 -10 -5.434 -0.375
25.356 12.103 (2.833) (3.385) (7.139)
Min relative humidity 51.639 40.846 -10.793 -1.624 3.273
16.004 8.698 (1.965) (2.246) (4.974)
Max relative humidity 94.457 90.808 -3.650 -0.928 3.329
6.794 6.487 (1.338) (1.682) (3.025)
Gas price 1 day ago 1.462 1.449 -0.013 0.021 0.048
0.121 0.116 (0.024) (0.034) (0.063)
Gas price 3 days ago 1.464 1.45 -0.014 0.016 0.041
0.121 0.107 (0.022) (0.032) (0.063)
Gas price 7 days ago 1.465 1.445 -0.020 0.002 0.036
0.118 0.121 (0.025) (0.033) (0.066)
Ozone (lag) 75.526 123.654 48.128 17.595 -7.890
23.293 20.829 (4.327) (5.607) (12.863)
Monday 0.197 0.192 -0.005 -0.102 0.063
0.398 0.402 (0.082) (0.112) (0.245)
Friday 0.208 0.154 -0.054 0.007 0.200
0.407 0.368 (0.076) (0.095) (0.154)
N 269 26 295 60 295
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are means and standard deviations (underneath) for non-code red days and code 
red days, respectively. Column (3) is the difference between CRD and non-CRD. Column (4) is the 
difference between CRD and code orange days. Column (5) is the estimate of CRD coefficient regressing 
each covariate on CRD and a fifth order polynomial in forecast ozone level. In the parentheses are standard 
errors. Those standard errors in the column (5) account for within-week clustering.
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Table 3-5. Impact of Code Red Day Announcement on Traffic Volumes by Time of Day
All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Morning Peak
Coefficient -0.017** -0.012 -0.026** -0.051* -0.051** -0.034 -0.063* -0.052* 0.008
Std. errors (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.030) (0.024) (0.046) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026)
N 1520 1059 461 1520 1059 461 736 517 219
2R 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97
Mid-day
Coefficient 0.033* 0.039* 0.018 0.026 0.045 -0.006 -0.084* -0.092 -0.02
Std. errors (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.043) (0.057) (0.030) (0.049) (0.056) (0.042)
N 1119 795 324 1119 795 324 485 360 125
2R 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.96 0.96 0.93
Evening Peak
Coefficient -0.007 0.004 -0.033* 0.03 0.07 -0.026* 0.011 0.068 -0.069**
Std. errors (0.02) (0.026) (0.017) (0.059) (0.093) (0.014) (0.102) (0.164) (0.029)
N 1157 787 370 1157 787 370 461 316 145
2R 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.92
Other
Coefficient 0.006 0.012 -0.013 -0.019 -0.01 -0.050* 0.009 0.018 -0.028
Std. errors (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.049)
N 1201 839 362 1201 839 362 566 398 168
2R 0.95 0.96 0.83 0.95 0.96 0.83 0.97 0.98 0.88
Note: Dependent variable is log of traffic volumes. Control variables include weather conditions and their lags, forecast 1-hour ozone concentration, 
observed ozone level for the day before, lagged retail gas prices, and dummies for year, month, day of the week, public holiday and monitor. Columns (1)-
(3) control for linear ozone forecast only. Columns (4)-(9) control for a fifth-order polynomial in ozone forecast. Columns (7)-(9) focus on a sub-sample 
excluding code green days. Standard errors account for within-week clustering. * indicates significance at 10 percent level while ** at 5 percent level.
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Table 3-6. Robustness Check
All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Morning Peak
Code orange or both 0.019 0.036* -0.003 0.005 0.025 -0.016
(0.02) (0.021) (0.025) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
Code red day -0.028* -0.037* -0.018 -0.049* -0.038** -0.042
(0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.043)
N 903 627 276 1520 1059 461 1520 1059 461
2R 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96
Mid-day
Code orange or both -0.017 -0.025 -0.003 -0.011 -0.013 -0.006
(0.027) (0.035) (0.028) (0.030) (0.037) (0.033)
Code red day -0.001 0.006 0.002 0.02 0.038 -0.009
(0.059) (0.080) (0.040) (0.047) (0.063) (0.035)
N 669 473 196 1119 795 324 1119 795 324
2R 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.87
Evening Peak
Code orange or both -0.024 -0.053 0.019 -0.018 -0.039 0.012
(0.032) (0.044) (0.016) (0.040) (0.057) (0.017)
Code red day 0.053 0.123 -0.032 0.019 0.047 -0.019
(0.114) (0.188) (0.020) (0.070) (0.110) (0.014)
N 679 459 220 1157 787 370 1157 787 370
2R 0.92 0.90 0.60 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.88
Other
Code orange or both 0.016 0.02 0.021 0.013 0.02 0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.025)
Code red day 0.030 0.023 0.029 -0.012 0 -0.046
(0.028) (0.029) (0.046) (0.020) (0.019) (0.032)
N 718 506 212 1201 839 362 1201 839 362
2R 0.96 0.97 0.64 0.95 0.96 0.83 0.95 0.96 0.83
Note: Dependent variable is log of traffic volumes. Columns (1)-(3) use samples excluding Monday and Friday. Columns (4)-(6) replace the CRD dummy with a 
code-red-or-orange dummy. Columns (7)-(9) add a code-orange dummy in addition to the CRD dummy. Standard errors account for within-week clustering. * 
indicates significance at 10 percent level while ** at 5 percent level.
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Table 3-7. Impact of CRDs in Sequence on Traffic Volumes by Time of Day
All Inbound Outbound All Inbound Outbound
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Morning Peak
Code red days -0.057* -0.058** -0.034 -0.054* -0.051** -0.035
(0.030) (0.024) (0.047) (0.028) (0.022) (0.047)
CRDs in Seq. 0.013* 0.015 0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
N 1520 1059 461 1520 1059 461
2R 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96
Mid-day
Code red days 0.020 0.040 -0.009 0.011 0.029 -0.009
(0.042) (0.056) (0.028) (0.039) (0.053) (0.026)
CRDs in Seq. 0.015 0.015 0.006 0.043 0.049 0.007
(0.035) (0.044) (0.016) (0.029) (0.034) (0.028)
N 1119 795 324 1119 795 324
2R 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.87
Evening Peak
Code red days 0.020 0.056 -0.029 0.045 0.094 -0.033**
(0.047) (0.072) (0.019) (0.062) (0.098) (0.016)
CRDs in Seq. 0.017 0.024 0.005 -0.035 -0.054 0.017
(0.030) (0.047) (0.021) (0.023) (0.033) (0.021)
N 1157 787 370 1157 787 370
2R 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.88
Other
Code red days -0.011 -0.002 -0.043 -0.016 -0.006 -0.045*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027)
CRDs in Seq. -0.017 -0.021 -0.014 -0.008 -0.011 -0.014
(0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
N 1201 839 362 1201 839 362
2R 0.95 0.96 0.83 0.95 0.96 0.83
Note: Dependent variable is log of traffic volumes. Columns (1)-(3) has one additional dummy equal 
to one if the code red day is the second, third or fourth one in a row. Columns (4)-(6) has a dummy 
equal to one if the code red day is the third or fourth one in a row. Standard errors account for within-
week clustering. * indicates significance at 10 percent level while ** at 5 percent level.
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4 Concluding Comments
4.1 Summary of Results
Chapter 2 calculates the percent of workers who use the Internet when 
working at home in a person’s two-digit occupation by city size cell to instrument for 
telecommuting choice. After controlling for occupation and city fixed effects, as well 
as individual and household characteristics, this variable still predicts men and 
married women’s probability to telecommute: a 10 percentage point increase in the 
internet penetration causes telecommuting probability to rise by 5 percentage points 
for married women and 3 percentage points for men.
Using this variable to instrument for telecommuting choice yields IV 
estimates that telecommuting leads a married women’s one-way commute time to 
increase by 9 to 12 minutes. The effect on men’s commute length is smaller, at about
5 minutes and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The results are robust for 
different specifications and sub-samples. Contrary to the OLS estimates, IV 
estimation finds that probability of commuting by driving does not decline due to 
telecommuting. For the average married female worker who commutes 24 minutes 
one way five days a week, telecommuting lowers weekly total commute time from 
240 minutes to 198 minutes if the woman telecommutes two days a week. This means 
a 17 percent reduction, less proportional to the reduction in commuting frequency.
Chapter 3 finds that the code red day announcement results in a 4-5 percent 
reduction in vehicle commute trips in morning peak hours. However, this estimate is 
obtained only when we include in the regression a flexible function of forecast ozone 
levels, which is designed to control for the correlation between the code red day 
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indicator and any non-random unobservables. If only the linear term of forecast ozone 
level is controlled in the regression, the estimate is as small as 1.7 percent. The 
difference highlights the importance of the identification strategy used.
The conclusion from these results is that the two TDM strategies work to 
some degree. Telecommuting is not shown to have a rebound effect on men’s 
commute length. For married women, the effect seems moderate enough to result in a 
net reduction in commute miles. Consistent with findings in northern California, 
information about bad air quality could induce a small proportion of people to refrain 
from driving. It is more likely that these people will work from home rather than to 
switch to another travel mode. The effect, however, is not large enough to cause air 
quality improvements.
4.2 Directions for Future Research
Some questions related this dissertation remain unsolved. The instrumental 
variable developed in Chapter 2 does not have much power in explaining single 
women’s telecommuting choices. Thus, the analysis cannot provide information 
about the responses of single females to telecommuting. 
Commuting length reflects both residential location choice and work location 
choice. Telecommuters who choose longer one-way commute distances could choose 
to live farther from work or to work farther from home. It is important to distinguish 
the two possibilities from a public policy perspective. 
For a two-earner household, housing location is determined jointly by both 
husband’s and wife’s employment locations. A change in one person’s commuting 
cost might lead to changes in the commute lengths of both people. In this case, the 
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sum of commute lengths of the household would be be the variable of interest. More 
research is needed to understand the impact of household members’ telecommuting 
on total household commute length.
A natural extension of Chapter 3 is to apply the same technique to similar 
programs that have free bus fares. Free bus fares decrease the cost of riding a bus. 
However, for people who are used to driving, a larger share of the cost of switching to 
transit is the time and inconvenience to get on a bus. Moreover, it is of interest to 
know whether such a program passes the cost-benefit test. The voluntary program 
takes an episodic approach to controlling ozone, which is valuable in designing a 
pricing control scheme. Since ozone episodes occur only on hot, sunny days, the 
government could set a price for driving on those days. Daily automobile travel and
resultant emissions could be managed by choosing a permit price. The cost-
effectiveness of such a program if implemented in the Washington metropolitan area 
is being evaluated in an ongoing project.
Finally, economists may not want to give up the idea of managing travel 
demand via non-pricing strategies. Many TDM strategies may be effective in various 
contexts and even cost-effective if the political costs of pricing strategies are taken 




Appendix 1 A Monocentric City Model with Commuters and Telecommuters
In a closed city, each household has only one worker and all employment 
concentrates in the central business district (CBD). Workers commute to work at the 
CBD along a radial network. Commuting costs per mile traveled are e , so a worker 
who lives d  miles from the CBD spends 2ed  on daily commuting. All workers earn 
the same income y  per day. Household utility is described by a strictly quasi-
concave function ( , )u c h , where c  represents consumption of a composite non-
housing good and h  is consumption of housing that could be measured in square feet 
of floor space or number of rooms. The price of the composite good is assumed to be 
the same across different locations of the city and normalized to 1. The daily rental 
price of a unit of housing, denoted p , depends on location. 
Initially, suppose all workers are identical. They maximize household utility to 
reach a constant level, u . That is 
{ , }
max ( , )
c h
u c h u (A1)
s.t. 2c ph ed y   .
Substitute 2c y ph ed    into Eq. (A1) and notice that equilibrium housing price 
and consumption are both functions of distance to the CBD, i.e. d . We have
 ( ) ( ) 2 , ( )u y p d h d ed h d u   . (A2)
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Totally differentiating Eq. (A2) and applying the envelop theorem, we get the well-
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Eqs. (A3) and (A4) imply that the housing price declines with commuting distance 
and the rent gradient gets flatter as distance increases since '( ) 0h d  . Plotted on a 
plane with distance to the CBD as the x-axis and rent as the y-axis, the rent curve is a 
downward-sloping convex function. Intuitively, workers who live in the suburbs with 
longer commute are compensated by cheaper and larger homes.  
Now, extend the model to including two types of otherwise identical workers: 
commuters ( c ) and telecommuters ( tc ). Because the latter commute less often than 
the former, the average daily commuting costs are lower for telecommuters than for 
commuters. Therefore, there are separate rent offer curves for the two types of 











where ,i c tc . Assuming that housing is a normal good, then ( ) ( )c tch d h d . 
Together with c tce e , we have
( ) ( )c tcp d p d  .
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The rent offer of telecommuters declines slower than that of commuters. Figure A1
illustrates the two rent offer curves and the market rent gradient in equilibrium. The 
telecommuters' rent offer curve (CD) is flatter than commuters' rent offer curve (AB) 
while the two intersect at a certain distance od d . Commuters outbid telecommuters 
for housing at locations closer to the CBD ( od d ), as segment AO lies above CO, 
and vice versa for locations beyond od . The market equilibrium rent gradient is the 
upper segments of the two offer curves (AO and OD). This means in equilibrium 
commuters occupy the entire ring-shaped region around the CBD from distance 0 to 
od  while telecommuters sort into the surrounding ring from od  to 
*d , the city edge 
determined by exogenous farmland rent. Thus, telecommuters have longer commutes 
than commuters.
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Appendix 2 Imputation of Top-Coded Commuting Time in the PUMS
First, I estimate a Pareto distribution to approximate the right-hand tail of the 
commute time distribution, i.e.
( 1)( ) a af x ab x  , for b x  
where a  is the parameter of the distribution, b  is a constant from which commuting 
time is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution, x  is observed individual commuting 
time equal to or greater than b . To obtain an estimate for a , I estimate Pr( )x t , 
where t  is the top-coded value, i.e. 99 in PUMS, by the fraction of people commuting 












Then, the top-coded values are replaced by the estimated conditional expectation 
of commuting time, 
1( | ) ( 1)E x x t ta a    
where t  is the top-coded value, i.e. 99 in PUMS. Thus, different values for b  yield 
different estimates of a  and the imputing value for top-coded observations.
For instance, let 50b  , then 378,211 observations have commuting time equal 
to or above 50 minutes, 16.4 percent of which are top-coded observations. Thus,
 ln(0.164) / ln(50) ln(99) 2.65a    . The conditional expectation for top-coded 
individuals equals 159.1. When b  is varied from 40 to 90 in increments of 10, the 
conditional expectation estimates vary from 123 to 165 with an average of 150.
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Table A1. CPS and NHTS Sample Construction
May 2001 CPS 2001 NHTS
Original sample 131,997 160,758




Reasonable commute distance and speed 62,283
MSA residents 32,272 50,810
Final sample without missing values on 
any covariates
29,147 47,730
Note: Reasonable commute distance refers to one-way commute time below 180 minutes and 
commute distance below 180 miles; reasonable speed refers to speed between 0.01 mile per 
minute and 1.5 miles per minute.
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Table A2. Distributions by Commute Mode across Cities
Commute mode Driving Rail Bus
Nationwide cities with 1 million or more 
population
0.878 0.044 0.463
Atlanta, GA 0.964 0.002 0.013
Baltimore, MD 0.883 0.032 0.053
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI 0.819 0.112 0.034
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA 0.822 0.041 0.071
Washington DC-VA-MD-WV 0.831 0.072 0.064
Source: Author’s calculation using NHTS 2001. Commute mode is defined as transportation mode to 
work last week covering most of the distance.
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Table A3. Full Results of Regression Discontinuity Models (Code red day coefficients correspond to Columns (4)-(6) in Table 3-5)
All Inbound Outbound
Morning Mid-day Evening Other Morning Mid-day Evening Other Morning Mid-day Evening Other
Ozone forecast -0.016 -0.009 0.083 -0.036 -0.032 -0.013 0.151 -0.037 0.020 0.030 -0.032 -0.030
(0.052) (0.058) (0.064) (0.027) (0.049) (0.079) (0.091) (0.027) (0.067) (0.033) (0.037) (0.041)
2nd order forecast 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
3rd order forecast -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4th order forecast 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
5th order forecast -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag observed ozone -0.000** 0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. wind speed 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Min. humidity 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Max. humidity 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)




-0.007** -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Min temperature -0.002** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Precipitation -
0.000***
0.000 0.000 -0.000 -
0.000***
0.000 0.000 -0.000 -
0.000***
-0.000 -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag avg. wind spd. 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag min. humidity -0.001** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag max. humidity 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
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Lag max. temp. -0.000 -0.001 -0.005** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006** -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag min. temp. 0.000 0.002** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.006*** 0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lag precipitation -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag gas price -0.078 -0.109 0.108 -0.008 -0.081 -0.155 0.115 -0.004 -0.038 -0.074 0.024 -0.063
(0.052) (0.099) (0.180) (0.086) (0.050) (0.124) (0.257) (0.088) (0.087) (0.109) (0.058) (0.101)
2nd lag gas price 0.030 0.081 -0.071 0.160 0.059 0.091 -0.017 0.172 -0.040 0.119 -0.051 0.150
(0.066) (0.108) (0.162) (0.118) (0.060) (0.140) (0.230) (0.116) (0.131) (0.074) (0.046) (0.131)
3rd lag gas price -0.012 -0.126 -0.202 -0.087 -0.014 -0.151 -0.373 -0.103 0.103 -0.039 -0.081 0.003
(0.100) (0.122) (0.168) (0.122) (0.082) (0.155) (0.235) (0.123) (0.109) (0.091) (0.097) (0.123)
4th lag gas price 0.073 0.109 -0.034 -0.005 -0.036 0.206 0.005 -0.011 0.088 -0.046 -0.007 0.001
(0.116) (0.118) (0.150) (0.116) (0.085) (0.160) (0.213) (0.123) (0.092) (0.121) (0.118) (0.151)
5th lag gas price -0.173 -0.194* 0.153 -0.082 -0.172 -0.203 0.212 -0.062 -0.108 -0.235* 0.089 -0.181
(0.128) (0.114) (0.150) (0.116) (0.145) (0.128) (0.238) (0.113) (0.125) (0.135) (0.098) (0.171)
6th lag gas price 0.052 0.033 0.251 0.111 0.065 -0.095 0.340 0.099 -0.015 0.220 -0.001 0.189
(0.124) (0.138) (0.204) (0.138) (0.144) (0.156) (0.277) (0.140) (0.100) (0.261) (0.087) (0.195)
7th lag gas price 0.081 0.190* -0.108 -0.076 0.152* 0.299** -0.152 -0.082 -0.015 0.019 0.041 -0.087
(0.065) (0.097) (0.140) (0.065) (0.078) (0.126) (0.181) (0.087) (0.074) (0.171) (0.085) (0.089)
Year 2002 0.012 0.020** 0.008 0.019 0.011 0.013 -0.001 0.009 0.017* 0.045*** 0.027** 0.036**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
Year 2003 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.016 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.010 0.046*** 0.055*** 0.066*** 0.039*** 0.060***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
June 0.025** -0.016 -
0.072***
0.029** 0.014 -0.033* -
0.107***
0.031** 0.034** 0.022 0.001 0.030**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.024) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.039) (0.012) (0.016) (0.021) (0.008) (0.015)
July 0.022* 0.027** -0.008 0.042*** 0.001 0.012 -0.014 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.001 0.049***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.029) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.011) (0.015)
August 0.029** 0.037*** 0.015 0.047*** 0.014 0.024 0.016 0.045*** 0.045** 0.054** 0.019 0.052***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.029) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.012) (0.018)
September 0.004 -0.026** 0.009 -0.031* 0.013 -0.037** 0.012 -0.024 -0.019 -0.017 0.010 -0.041*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.021)
Tuesday 0.019*** -0.007 0.003 0.034*** 0.009* -0.004 0.004 0.024*** 0.033*** -0.013 0.012 0.055***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.019) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
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Wednesday 0.030*** 0.002 0.011 0.081*** 0.015** 0.001 0.004 0.071*** 0.055*** 0.007 0.032*** 0.107***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.022) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Thursday 0.049*** 0.020* 0.035** 0.131*** 0.029*** 0.007 0.029 0.109*** 0.083*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.179***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
Friday 0.033*** 0.139*** 0.099*** 0.220*** -0.006 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.184*** 0.111*** 0.201*** 0.075*** 0.295***





















(0.054) (0.034) (0.042) (0.034) (0.043) (0.037) (0.059) (0.038) (0.080) (0.035) (0.017) (0.030)
Detector 2 1.480*** 0.475*** 0.101*** 0.422*** 1.479*** 0.463*** 0.096** 0.424***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.036) (0.013) (0.020) (0.025) (0.036) (0.013)




(0.014) (0.018) (0.030) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
Detector 4 1.624*** 0.994*** 0.881*** 0.750*** 1.625*** 0.995*** 0.885*** 0.752***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.033) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.034) (0.010)
Detector 5 1.427*** 0.965*** 0.859*** 0.633*** 1.427*** 0.968*** 0.867*** 0.635***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.031) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.032) (0.013)
Detector 6 1.250*** 0.841*** 0.931*** 0.514*** 0.213***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.033) (0.011) (0.008)
Detector 7 1.114*** 0.160*** -0.045 -
0.049***
1.114*** 0.158*** -0.045 -
0.047***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.012)
Code red days -0.051* 0.026 0.030 -0.019 -0.051** 0.045 0.070 -0.010 -0.034 -0.006 -0.026* -0.050*
(0.030) (0.043) (0.059) (0.019) (0.024) (0.057) (0.093) (0.018) (0.046) (0.030) (0.014) (0.027)
Constant 8.050*** 8.487*** 7.485*** 8.907*** 8.347*** 8.643*** 6.551*** 9.008*** 8.620*** 8.425*** 9.807*** 9.205***
(0.702) (0.804) (0.891) (0.427) (0.675) (1.091) (1.242) (0.418) (0.903) (0.455) (0.553) (0.630)
Observations 1520 1119 1157 1201 1059 795 787 839 461 324 370 362
R-squared 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.86 0.96 0.96 0.87 0.88 0.83
Standard errors in the parenthesis account for within-week clustering.* indicates significance at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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